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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
INTERVENTION IN POST-CONFLICT CROATIA AND THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
 
 
 
 Athina Giannaki 
 
 
 
M.A. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Nimet Beriker 
 
 
 
Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are two 
countries which have been established after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in 1991. 
Shortly after its independence and till 1995 Croatia faced a bloody civil war, between the 
government and the Serbian minority of the country. FYROM avoided a full scaled war, 
but it faced a destructive crisis in 2001 between the government and the Albanian 
minority. The crisis, however, was managed quickly, especially with the help of the 
international community. 
 
This thesis examines the type of European Union’s (EU) intervention, as a third 
party, in the post-conflict environment of the two countries. A short comparison of the 
two cases indicates the commonalities and differences between them. The data used in 
this thesis were mainly gathered from various European Union’s official documents.  
 
 vii 
The results of the thesis suggest that for both cases the EU’s intervention was 
primarily a structural intervention.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
UYUŞMAZLIK SONRASI HIRVATİSTAN VE ESKİ YUGOSLAV MAKEDONYA 
CUMHURİYETİ’DEKİ AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ  
UYUŞMAZLIK ÇÖZÜMÜ MÜDAHALELERİNİN ANALİZİ 
 
 
 
 Athina Giannaki 
 
 
 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisans, Sanatta Yeterlilik Tezi 
 
 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Nimet Beriker 
 
 
 
Avrupa Birliği, bölgesel bir örgüt olarak, son birkaç on yılda uyuşmazlık önleme 
ve barış inşası konularında tüm dünyada üçüncü taraf olarak etkin bir katılım 
sergilemektedir. Ancak AB, Avrupa kıtasında daha da aktiftir ve bu tezin incelediği iki 
vaka sözkonusu kıtayı kapsamaktadır.  
 
Hırvatistan ve Eski Yugoslav Makedonya Cumhuriyeti (EYMC), 1991’de 
Yugoslavya’nın dağılması sonrasında oluşmuş iki ülkedir. Hırvatistan, bağımsızlığını 
kazanmasının hemen akabinde başlayıp 1995 yılına kadar süren ve hükümetle ülkedeki 
Sırp azınlık arasında gerçekleşen, kanlı bir iç savaş yaşamıştır. EYMC ise, 2001’de tam 
anlamıyla bir savaşa mani olunmuşsa da, hükümet ve Arnavut azınlık arasında yıkıcı bir 
krizle yüzleşmiştir. Ancak bu kriz, özellikle de uluslararası toplumun yardımıyla hızlı bir 
şekilde yönetilmiştir. 
 
Bu tez Avrupa Birliği (AB)’nin, üçüncü taraf olarak, her iki ülkedeki uyuşmazlık 
sonrası ortama müdahalesinin türünü incelemektedir. İki vakanın kısa bir karşılaştırması 
 ix
aralarındaki benzerlik ve farklara dikkat çekmektedir. Tezde kullanılan bilgiler temel 
olarak çeşitli resmi Avrupa Birliği dökümanlarından toplanmıştır.  
 
Tezin sonuçları, her iki vaka için de AB’nin müdahalesinin özde bir yapısal 
müdahale şeklinde olduğu göstermiştir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, Hırvatistan, EYMC, üçüncü taraf, yapısal müdahale  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, many international and regional organizations have 
been actively involved with conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict 
peacebuilding. Among them, the European Union (EU), as one of the most powerful 
regional organizations in the world, has shown an increased interest in conflict resolution, 
especially towards countries of the European continent. Two of these cases, where the 
EU became involved as a third party, are examined in this thesis.  
 
One of the events which characterize the end of the 20th century is the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. Prolonged wars, thousands of victims, millions of refugees followed the 
dissolution, which the EU failed to prevent. In the aftermath of the wars, when the new 
states were struggling to find their own position in Europe, the EU had a second chance 
to intervene and undertake a leading role in the reconstruction of the countries. Their 
development became a major goal of the EU, in its attempt to bring stability and peace in 
its region.  
 
In that phase, the post-conflict period, part of the third party’s role is to prevent a 
renewed conflict. The settlement of a conflict does not imply the impossibility of re-
escalation, if root causes are not addressed. Any new conflict in the area would have been 
a major threat to EU’s solidity, due to the geographical position of those countries. 
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Furthermore, at that time, the EU’s aspirations to be a global actor who can act 
effectively in the conflict resolution field had grown significantly.  
 
These aspirations are clearly evident in the various changes in the EU’s policies and 
instruments of conflict resolution. The EU was actually moving towards the creation of a 
more concrete framework, regarding its foreign policy and its role as an international 
actor and conflict prevention and transformation, became one of the Union’s principal 
objectives. This growing commitment to conflict resolution, both regionally and 
internationally, in addition to the EU’s wish to diminish any possibility for renewed 
conflicts in the Balkans, explains EU’s intervention as a third party to the area. 
 
This thesis examines two cases of the Balkans; Croatia and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Through this comparative research, my aim is to 
explore a little examined area, that of the EU conflict resolution mechanisms in the post-
conflict environment of its periphery. I will present and analyze all EU activities and the 
instruments used in those two countries to prevent future conflict escalation and 
transform the root causes of the conflicts, leading to conflict resolution.  
 
One of the most powerful tools of conflict resolution for the EU, which is used 
widely the last years, is the power of membership. Its power lies in the leverage it gives 
to the EU to ask for certain consensus from the potential members, in return for the 
economic and political help the EU provides. However, it is not the only tool of conflict 
resolution used by the EU in the case of post-conflict Croatia and the FYROM. A number 
of other instruments are also used, unrelated to the prospect of membership.   
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, were I 
present the scope and objective of the thesis and I explain the value of this study. 
 
The second chapter consists of two parts. The first part is devoted to the literature 
review. As the study is concerned with the intervention of the EU, as a third party, in the 
two cases under examination, it is important that the thesis will start by examining the 
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various third party instruments of intervention, as presented in the conflict resolution 
literature. The second part deals with the methodological issues. Hence, I will elaborate 
on the scope and objective of the thesis and the methodology used for addressing the 
issue.  
 
Before continue with the presentation and analysis of the data, it is important to 
clarify the structure of the EU. Therefore, in the third chapter I present the various 
institutions through which the EU implements its conflict resolution policies.  
 
A brief historical background of the conflicts, the conflict resolution procedure 
which was followed, current situation of the two countries and their relationship with the 
EU is given in the fourth chapter. 
 
The presentation of the instruments used by the EU for intervening in the post 
conflict environment of Croatia and FYROM is given in the fifth chapter. The first part of 
this chapter will be devoted in Croatia and the second in FYROM. 
 
In the next chapter, these instruments are analyzed and categorized according to a 
framework, adopted from the conflict resolution literature.  
 
The final chapter, the conclusions, provides an overview of the thesis and further 
theoretical and empirical implications are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Third parties according to Young (as cited in Mitchell 1988:48) are actors which 
become significantly involved in a conflict without total identification with either of the 
parties. Sandole (in Cheldelin, et al. 2003:49) argues that a third party intervention is an 
“attempt to facilitate processes leading to quite different, albeit potentially interrelated 
outcomes”. More concrete, the third party can prevent the conflict from erupting, control 
it from spreading, settle it or even deal with the underlying causes of it. Having achieved 
this the third party may also decide to work on the long-term relationships among the 
parties. Since the third party intervention is crucial in the conflict resolution (CR) field, 
the literature on this subject is inevitably huge. This body of work concerns issues, such 
as who can be a third party, when shall the third party intervene, what kind of action it 
shall take, when is it successful, etc.  
 
Third party can be an individual, a non-governmental organization (NGO), a 
regional or an international organization or even a state. The conflict resolution field 
distinguishes between Track I and Track II actors. While Track I refers to 
governmental/international government organizations, Track II refers to local, national 
and international conflict resolution NGOs and other non-governmental actors (Sandole 
in Cheldelin et. all, 2003:51).  
 
  6 
As Crocker points out (in Crocker et al. 1996:189) individual governments, 
regional peacekeeping or peace enforcement efforts and the United Nations (UN) are 
usually engaged in military interventions. A similarly broad range of governmental, 
intergovernmental and other, such as NGOs, media, specialized civil society and conflict 
resolution groups, humanitarian relief and development organization, etc, players may 
intervene in nonmilitary ways (overt, covert, economic, diplomatic, public or private) to 
manage and resolve conflict. 
 
The conflict resolution literature presents a plethora of third party activities, 
organized under different categories and sub-categories. For instance, based on the 
conflict stage: preventive intervention during unstable peace, crisis management during a 
crisis, conflict management in case of a war, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding after an agreement is reached and conflict de-escalates (Lund, 1996:386). 
However, even under each of these categories third parties can undertake a variety of 
actions. This thesis presents four major categories of third party intervention, conflict 
prevention, mediation, track II diplomacy, and peacekeeping/peacebuilding, each of 
which encompasses many activities, as presented in the following part.  
 
 
 
2.1.1. CONFLICT PREVENTION 
 
 
The prevention of violent conflicts has become especially important in the last 
decades, especially after the genocide in Rwanda, the dissolution and the wars which 
followed in the former Yugoslavia, and other cases. Furthermore, the number of actors 
involved in conflict prevention is constantly growing. States, international and regional 
organizations, international, regional and local non governmental organizations have 
developed various mechanisms in order to be effective in conflict prevention.   
 
Many scholars have addressed the issue of conflict prevention and they have 
come up with their definitions. Most definitions share some similarities; the differences 
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however are notable and crucial. Conflict prevention is general defined by the specialists 
as any action which prevent the arise of conflicts, the conflict escalation into violence and 
the re-emergence of violence (Wallensteen:1998, Lund:2002, Boutros-Ghali:1992, 
Stewart, Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict:1999, Ryan:1998, 
Bedjaoui:2000). A common characteristic of these definitions is that they include actions 
taken in all stages of a conflict.  
Another group of scholars portrays the different stages of the conflict and the 
appropriate actions that can be undertaken. For instance, Ackermann (2000:19) proposes 
that conflict prevention measures should not just aim to prevent violence, but also to be 
initiated in the post conflict phase. For that, she defines conflict prevention in a pre-
violent stage as preventive diplomacy, and at a post-conflict stage as post-conflict peace-
building. Another definition of conflict prevention, based on the time used, is given by 
Reychler (2001). He distinguishes proactive violence prevention, as any effort which 
prevents conflicts from crossing the threshold of violence, from reactive violence 
prevention, the aim of which is to prevent a further escalation of the conflict by 
controlling the intensity of the violence, by reducing the duration of the conflict, and by 
containing or preventing geographical spillover (p.4). 
 
Even though most of the scholars agree that a mixture of different measures is 
necessary in order for conflict prevention to be more effective, there is no unanimity as 
for the exact measures. Moller et al. (2005) divide the conflict prevention measures into 
peaceful and coercive measures. The first category includes actions, such as verbal 
attention, relief efforts, facilitation, third party coordination, proposals and decisions. On 
the other hand carrots, sticks, threats to use coercive measures, as defined in chapter VII 
of the United Nation’s (UN) Chapter, and decisions to carry out such threats are the 
coercive measures of the typology (p.6). Jentleson (2003) also finds the combination of 
coercive and non-coercive measures as the basis of successful conflict prevention. A 
more detailed tool box of conflict prevention is offered by Lund (2002:101). It includes 
diplomacy, interactive conflict resolution, economic development, education, health, 
agriculture, and so on, as well as commercial activities. 
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Ackermann, who distinguishes, as seen above, conflict prevention measures 
depending on the conflict stage, offers concrete conflict prevention actions. Preventive 
diplomacy includes a variety of measures, such as monitoring systems, preventive 
peacekeeping forces, creation of communication channels among the parties, economic 
assistance, problem-solving workshops, etc. The post-conflict peacebuilding can be 
achieved through rapprochement, reconciliation and institution building. For her, conflict 
prevention should be more focused not on how to prevent, but to the in depth analysis of 
the causes and the dynamics of the conflicts.   
 
Cockell (in Hampson and Malone, 2002:192) differentiates three components of 
preventing diplomacy: early warning, key decisions on early actions and strategies of 
actions. Boutros-Ghali (1992) identifies four strategies for conflict prevention: preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, and peace-building. For Bercovitch (1996) 
conflict prevention policies fall under three categories: early warning systems, 
confidence-building measures, and mediation and related diplomatic missions. In a recent 
study Bercovitch et. al proposes that preventive deployment, facilitation, third party 
mediation, and fact finding missions are the instruments of conflict prevention.  (2005) 
Ryan argues that the time of conflict prevention distinguishes two types of peacekeeping; 
preventive and “traditional”. The former tries to stop destructive conflicts from occurring, 
while the latter responds after destructive violence is underway.  
 
The literature refers to two categories of conflict prevention. The direct, 
operational or light prevention and the structural, root causes or deep prevention 
(Wallensteen & Möller: 1998, Peck: 1998, Aggestam in Carey, Richmon: 2003, 
Jentleson, 2000: 10, Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse: 1999). The first refers to measures 
to address immediate crises (e.g. sending high-level diplomatic missions to mediate 
between parties, using economic tools such as sanctions, inducements, or collecting 
weapons and demobilizing fighting units), and employing forceful measures such as 
deploying peacekeepers to a region. The former address root causes such as poverty, 
political repression and uneven distribution of resources, which can, if left unattended, 
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escalate into violence. This is a long-term approach which aims to promote development, 
good governance, reduce poverty, promote human rights, etc. 
 
Another trait that the literature focuses on is the conflict prevention actors. 
Wallensteen (in Hamson and Malone, 2002: 214) pays special attention to the fact that 
these actions are taken by third parties, not by the primary parties themselves. Carment & 
Schnabel (2003:11) talk about a variety of actors.  Ackermann (2000) in her conflict 
prevention framework, identifies four levels of prevention, top leadership, leaders of 
ethnic groups and political movements, international/regional organizations, NGOs and 
other grassroots organizations, together with approaches/actions they can undertake.  
 
The report of the Aspen Institute conference (1996) highlights that even though 
public opinion identifies conflict prevention with military intervention, preventive action 
must occur on several levels. The primary responsibility for conflict prevention lies with 
the government and civil society of the country. Nevertheless, external assistance is often 
needed. For that the second level of responsibility is the international community: 
regional/international organizations, and other states. Finally, the role of NGOs is 
increasingly recognized as of highly importance in conflict prevention.  
 
 
 
2.1.2. MEDIATION 
 
 
In case a conflict was not prevented from erupting, the third party can use a 
variety of methods in order to contribute to the resolution of it. Mediation is one of the 
most commonly used techniques. The field, however, lacks of a general accepted 
definition of mediation. Many definitions have been proposed, each of which focuses on 
a different aspect. Some are outcome-oriented, arguing that mediation helps the parties 
achieve a settlement of their dispute (Young, 1967:34, Mitchell, 1981:287, Blake and 
Mouton, 1985:15). Other focuses on the neutrality and impartiality of the mediator 
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(Bingham, 1985:5, Moore, 1986:14, Spencer and Yang, 1993: 1495). Bercovitch 
(1996:13), after having examined various issues related to the mediation process, such as 
mediators’ interests, mediators’ characteristics, dispute environment, etc, offers the 
following definition of mediation: “a reactive process of conflict management whereby 
parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or 
organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem 
without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law”.   
 
Two paradigms of mediation are described by Crocker et al. (1999:20-24): the 
structuralist and the social-psychological paradigm. The first “is based on the belief that 
through the use of persuasion, incentives and disincentives, parties can be led to and 
through a negotiated settlement”. Crucial in this paradigm is the notion of “ripeness” and 
the idea that often mediators have to use their leverage or power. The former “focuses on 
the processes of communication and exchange as a way to change perceptions and 
attitudes”. Dialogue and problem-solving workshops are central in this paradigm. The 
authors propose a synthesis of these paradigms, in which the mediators’ activities depend 
on the stage of the conflict (p.33). 
 
Mediator’s behavior can be also seen as a spectrum (Bercovitch&Houston, 
1996:29). “At the low end of the spectrum are communication-facilitation   strategies 
where a mediator takes a fairly passive role….In the second set a mediator exercises 
more formal control over situational aspects or the process of mediation…In the most 
active range of mediator behavior, the mediator affects the content and substance as well 
as the process of mediation”.   
 
In the same logic, Fisher and Keashly (as cited in Fisher, 1997) have developed 
the contingency model. According to that, third party interventions consist of the 
following: conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration and 
peacekeeping. Furthermore, a conflict can pass from four stages of increasing intensity: 
discussion, polarization, segregation, and destruction. For each of these phases a different 
type of third party intervention is needed (pp.164-167).  
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Similarly, Paffenholz (2001) has developed an even more detailed paradigm of 
different types of mediation. A mediator can offer: good offices (low-intervention 
mediation efforts); facilitation (occurs prior or parallel to the negotiations, when 
facilitators try to bring conflicting parties together); consultation (mediator acts like 
advisor to the conflicting parties); negotiation (a type of mediation, when a third party is 
involved and both sides are present. A negotiator tries to bring the different views of the 
conflicting parties together and helps them to formulate an agreement); mediation:1 
(mainly on the level of states; is more interfering than other types of mediation, because 
mediators give their own opinions of the process and usually try to develop their own 
plan for resolving a conflict); power mediation (states that are able to bring resources 
(financial “carrots” or military “sticks”) into the negotiations can practice this approach. 
This outcome oriented approach aims to identify the leaders of the conflicting parties and 
bring them together to negotiate or mediate a cease-fire and a peace accord); and non-
official mediation (practiced by many different types of actors, from academics to 
international or local NGOs and non-organized individuals. This approach is long-term 
and relationship-oriented, because it aims at re-building destroyed relationships between 
the conflicting parties) (pp.76-78).  
 
The literature refers very often to the importance of the right timing, which is 
implied in the above mentioned models. Zartman has introduced the concept of the 
ripeness, according to which a conflict is ripe for resolution when a mutual hurting 
stalemate exists, when parties’ efforts for solution are blocked and when power relations 
among the parties has changed (Kleiboer, 1996: 363). The ripe time for Crocker et al. 
(2003:152) encompasses three distinct dimensions. Operational and political readiness; 
strategic and diplomatic readiness; and being the right mediator with the appropriate 
relationships.   
 
The effectiveness of mediation is a very disputable issue of the literature. For 
Susskind and Babbit (1992) mediation is effective when “it results in one or more of the 
                                                 
1
 Mediation is used as a general term throughout from Paffenholz. When it appears in italics, it refers to a 
special form of mediation used within the mediation range.  
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following: the cessation of violence; agreements that allow each party to save face; good 
precedents in the eyes of the world community; arrangements that will insure 
implementation of the agreement; and better relationships among the disputing parties” 
(p.31). 
 
Mediation’s effectiveness depends on some conditions. For some scholars it 
depends of parties’ need and motivation for solution and from mediator’s sources, 
leverage and skills (Touval, 1992:233, Rubin, 1992:251)  Susskind and Babbit develop 
further the preconditions of an effective mediation: 1) Disputants must realize that they 
are unlikely to get what they want through unilateral action. 2) The alternative to 
agreement must involve unacceptable economic or political cost. 3) The representatives 
of the parties must have sufficient authority to speak for their members and to commit to 
a course of action. 4) Other international or regional interests with a stake in the dispute 
must exert pressure for resolution. 5) A mediator must be available who is acceptable to 
all sides (Susskind, Babbit, 1992: 31-35). 
  
 
2.1.3. TRACK II DIPLOMACY  
 
 
For many scholars (Fisher: 1999, Azar: 1990, Burton: 1990) destructive and 
protracted conflicts, which are based in deep-rooted inter-group cleavages, should be 
addressed with Track II diplomacy, which means interactive conflict resolution or 
problem-solving workshops. John Burton is the pioneer of the interactive conflict 
resolution. In the ’60s he and his colleagues used this approach to the conflict between 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as to the Cyprus conflict. Leonard Doob was 
also among those who developed this new approach.  Herbert Kelman and Edward Azar 
in building upon the work of Burton and Doob and offered a good deal in the field. 
Finally, this part would not be completed without a reference to the contributions of 
Christopher Mitchell and Ronald Fisher. 
  13 
The term track two diplomacy is attributed to Joseph Montville. He defines it as 
“unofficial, informal interaction between adversary groups or nations which aims to 
develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources 
in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (1987:7). Furthermore, he talks about three 
processes encompassed in track two diplomacy: problem-solving workshops, the 
influence of public opinion and cooperative economic development.  
 
Kelman defines interactive problem solving as “an academic-base, unofficial third 
party approach, bringing together representatives of parties in conflict for direct 
communication. The third party facilitates the process, without proposing solutions. The 
aim of the workshops is to promote a special type of communication, with a very specific 
purpose: to generate input into the political process and transform the relationship 
between the conflicting parties” (1992: 64-65).  Workshops are combined with various 
other activities, including contacting and interviewing decision makers and policy 
advisors, training third-party panel members and developing detailed policy analyses of 
the conflict (1997:247).  
 
Ronald Fisher developed his own framework, which he named interactive conflict 
resolution (1993).  Even though he agrees with Kelman on the third-party and the 
workshop method, he draws our attention to the participants, which should be unofficial 
and influential representatives of their groups. What is more, he proposes an initial model 
of the transfer process that allows for differential effects on the various constituencies 
(leadership, public-political, governmental-bureaucratic) in the home communities 
(1997). Finally, Broome (1997) focuses on the importance of the “interactive 
management” workshop, in which “relational empathy” is required in order for the 
parties to construct common views of the conflict and move towards its resolution.  
 
The fact that the third party devotes its attention to the interest of all the parties, in 
contrast to any traditional third party intervention, in a given dispute, is of major 
importance for Mitchell & Banks (1996: 5). The activities of Track II diplomacy are 
varied, according to Diamond & McDonald (1996: 39). They include problem solving 
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workshops, involvement as mediators or consultants to ongoing peace making processes, 
private one-on-one diplomacy, conferences, seminars training and education events, 
dialogue group, networking, confidence building, institution building, and acting as 
messengers or go-betweeners.  
 
The importance of Track II diplomacy has been highlighted by many scholars 
from a variety of points of views. The fact that these initiatives offer to the participants an 
environment suitable for fruitful discussion where exploratory talks about the underlying 
needs and interests of the two sides can take place, has be pointed out by Azar (2002). 
For other scholars the importance of Track II lies in the help it can offer during the pre-
negotiation phase (Zartman: 1989, Fisher: 1989, Wallensteen: 2002). Finally, Track II 
gives participants the ability to discuss very sensitive or taboo issues, which are difficult 
to be discussed during the official negotiations, free from fears that any party might be 
embarrassed in the process (Runald, 2002: 84-96). Fisher argues that subjective aspects 
of conflict, such as miscommunication, misperceptions and hostile attitudes, must be 
addressed in order to move toward true resolution or transformation of the conflict and 
this change can be achieved only with face-to-face interaction between representatives (in 
Davies&Kaufman, 2002:61). International and national conflicts can be de-escalated and 
resolved if Track Two diplomacy is further developed and implemented, according to 
McDonald (1991:202).  
 
 
 
2.1.4. PEACEBUILDING, PEACEKEEPING 
 
 
Peacebuilding is usually defined as an attempt to build a new social environment 
of sustainable peace (Reychler, 2001: 12, Jeong, 2000: 38, Reilly, 2003:175). For 
Tschirgi (2003:1) peacebuilding is more than just post-conflict reconstruction. “It 
encompasses peace and development agendas in support for conflict prevention, conflict 
management and post-conflict reconstruction”. Ball (in Crocker et al. 2001:722) 
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identifies two stages of peacebuilding. The first stage, the transition, aims to establish a 
government with sufficient degree of legitimacy to operate effectively and to implement 
key reforms mandated by the peace accords, while societal reconciliation is promoted. 
During the second phase, the consolidation, all these economic and social reforms, as 
well as the reconciliation process are further promoted.  
 
 Peacekeeping on the other hand is defined as the use of military operations in to 
order to implement a peace agreement (McLean, 1996:321, Evans in Hampson, 
1993:542). Jeong (2000:129-131) offers a broader definition of the scope of 
peacekeeping. For him the main function of contemporary peacekeeping is to assist in 
rebuilding political, administrative, economic and other infrastructure. Hampson 
(1996:542) offers a variety of peacekeeping activities, such as confidence-building 
measures, food distribution, providing transportation, restoring basic government 
services, monitoring cease-fire agreements, demobilization and disarmament.  
 
Peacebuilding and peacekeeping, however, are not totally unrelated. The United 
Nations Security Council identifies a connection between them and recognizes the value 
of including peacebuilding elements in the mandates of peacekeeping operations, while at 
the same time accepts that peacekeeping can be the beginning of the peacebuilding 
process (Kapungu: 2001). In addition, Jeong (in Cheldelin et al, 2003:291) indicates that 
the short-term goal of peacebuilding, to manage and prevent renewed violence, can be 
achieved with the help of peacekeeping forces.  
 
One of the most prominent names in the peacebuilding field is Lederach.  He has 
come up with a comprehensive framework of peace-building. Firstly, he identifies three 
levels of actors in peace-building, which can be shown as a pyramid. The top-level 
leadership represents the smallest people. This is followed by middle-range leadership, 
while the base of this pyramid represents the grassroots, the largest leadership. Secondly 
he presents the different approaches to peace-building of each level. Level one 
approaches focus on high level negotiations, led by highly visible, single mediator. 
Second level approaches include problem-solving workshops and training in conflict 
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resolution, led by insider, partial teams. Finally, the third level approaches aim to 
establish local peace commissions to end the fighting and then offer grassroots’ training, 
prejudice reduction and psychological work in post-war trauma (1995: 145-155). 
 
In the literature the interrelation of post-conflict peace building and conflict 
prevention is strongly highlighted. Schnabel (2002) argues that peace building is 
sustainable only when it includes conflict prevention principles and he calls the 
preventive involvement in a post-conflict environment as second generation prevention, 
in contrast to pre-conflict prevention. Moreover, for Heong “preventing a return to 
violent confrontations through transforming relationships is an integral part of building a 
new communal structure acceptable to former adversaries” (p.22).  Reconciliation and 
reconstruction of community relations are vital parts of the peace building process.   
  
For de Graaf Bierbruwer and van Tongeren (in van Tongeren, et. all, 2002) 
effective peace-building and prevention of violent conflicts requires a framework. The 
structure they propose is consisted of three pillars; 1) building the community, 2) creating 
the capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building and 3) operational activities. The 
1st pillar refers to these activities which increase the awareness and the support of the 
public. The 2nd is about these activities which build up the capacity for conflict 
prevention and peace-building. Finally, the 3rd pillar’s goal is to stimulate and support the 
people who want to prevent the escalation of violence and to transform conflict as well as 
potential conflict into durable peace (pp.94-96).  
 
For Hawk (2002:127) peacebuilding mission should focus on (re) building a state 
along three dimensions: “(1) it must be capable of exercising authority over its territory 
and providing security to its citizens, (2) it must be effective at resolving conflicts 
through its institutions and promoting the general welfare of its citizens, and (3) it must 
provide a political identity based on accepted legitimacy”. 
 
The last decades a new trait in the peacebuilding area has been developed. 
Humanitarian or relief and development aid is being widely used and for that the 
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literature has started addressing this issue. The fact that this aid is usually distributed 
through NGOs, made Stein (in Stern, Druckman, 2000:388) talk about “privatization of 
humanitarian aid”. Anderson (2001, 258-264) urges those involved in the aid distribution 
to “do no harm”. She points out that humanitarian and development aid can even 
exacerbate, reinforce or prolong a conflict by feeding into worsening inter-group dividers 
or by ignoring and undermining inter-group connectors. Reychler takes that even further 
and puts the relief aid under a package of foreign policy measures. She argues that in 
order to be able to promote peace, aid should be accompanied with long-term conflict 
prevention and peace supporting processes (2001: 240).  
 
Since this thesis focuses on the post-conflict stage it is important to identify some 
characteristics of this stage as they come from the literature. It can be argued that third 
parties are expected to help not only for the cessation of violence, but also to promote 
positive peace (Galtung, 1990), thus removal of structural and cultural violence and 
promotion of long term reconciliation. In order to achieve that third parties should target 
both security issues, political stability, and economic development, but also 
reconciliation, as a process of “harmonizing of divergent stories; acquiescence in a given 
situation; and the restoration of friendly relations” (Pankhurst in Miall et. al, 1999:209). 
Or, as Moshe argues (2001), post-conflict peacebuilding on the one hand should promote 
relationships and institutions that strengthen human development and growth, and on the 
other hand the necessary structure to govern and protect. 
 
Dan Smith (2002) argues that post-conflict reconstruction has four traits: security, 
political stability, economic development, and reconciliation. “Security is needed against 
the resurgence of fighting; the political framework has to provide for democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law; economic reconstruction has to start with short-term needs 
while laying the foundations for long-term prosperity; reconciliation and trust building 
help former enemies regard each other merely as political opponents where disagreement 
is deep disputes are sharp, but each other trust the other to play by the rules” (p.446). 
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Junne & Verkoren offer a more detail strategy for post-conflict reconstruction, 
which at the same time operates as a conflict prevention framework. Address of security 
issues, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants; 
rebuilding of state institutions and democratization; development of local institutions; 
restoration or creation of rule of law; rebuilding infrastructure; media’s role; educational 
reforms; reorganization of the health system; environmental concerns; and economic 
reforms are, according to the authors, the issues which should be tackled in a post-
conflict society, in order to prevent a re-emerged conflict and move towards 
development. 
 
So far, the focus has been on the actions that a third party can undertake mainly 
with regard to the conflict stage or the conflict characteristics. Another type of 
categorization of all third party instruments for intervention, based not on the time of 
intervention, but aim of intervention, is suggested by Beriker (2007). Thus, actions 
aiming to “transform dysfunctional relationship among the conflicting parties with the 
aim of creating common intellectual and value space among the parties” are part of the 
transformative intervention category. Facilitative mediation, interactive conflict 
resolution, conflict-resolution training and post-conflict reconstruction are these kinds of 
activities. As seen from the above literature review, these activities are part of the 
mediation or track II diplomacy. 
 
The second type of intervention, the structural intervention, aims to “change the 
incentive structure of the disputing parties with an expectation that they would lead the 
parties to change their conflict behavior”. Positive incentives, peace-building, peace-
keeping, initiating bilateral cooperative programs, negative incentives, power mediation 
and military intervention are included in this category (Beriker, 2007:25-26). This 
category includes a variety of instruments, which usually in the literature can be found 
under the conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding/peacekeeping categories. The 
following table presents in detail this framework, which I adopt for this thesis. 
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THIRD PARTY ROLES 
A. Transformative intervention: “Actor intervenes in order to transform 
                                                 dysfunctional relationship among the conflicting  
                                                      parties, with the aim of creating common intellectual 
                                                       and value space among the parties”. 
A1-Facilitative mediation: Actor mediates with the aim of helping parties find their own 
                                 solutions. It can be in the forms of facilitating exchange of  
                                 information and problem-solving processes, and achieved by 
                                 introducing new resources to the conflict system, and enhancing 
                                 trust among the parties.  
A2-Interactive conflict resolution: State indirectly sponsors or helps to organize 
                                          unofficial third-party assisted, small group problem-solving 
                                           initiatives in order to solve their differences in informal 
                                           confidential settings.  
A3-Conflict-resolution training: It is a skill-building exercise conducted by the third- 
                                             parties with the aim of preparing participants to be more 
                                             effective in dealing their differences. 
A4- Post-conflict reconstruction: Actor initiates or supports social rehabilitation efforts 
                                                      in the conflict-torn nation. 
 
B. Structural intervention: “Actor intervenes as a third-party, and carries out 
                                           activities which are designed to change the incentive 
                                           structure of the disputing parties with an expectation 
                                          that they would lead the to change their conflict behavior”. 
B1-Positive Incentives: Actor as a third party offers financial and/or political rewards to 
                                     the disputing party with the aim of changing its conflict behavior.  
B2-Peacebuilding, peacekeeping: Helping the parties to build and develop democratic 
                                         institutions such as, electoral systems, financial reforms, and 
                                         constitution writing with the belief that democratic processes  
                                         will eliminate the structural causes of the conflict. Sending  
                                          peace forces to contain the dispute.  
B3-Initiating bilateral cooperative programs: Actor helps the parties to foster their 
                                                  bilateral cooperative programs mostly in law-politics 
                                                 areas, such as culture, business, education and sports.  
B4-Negative Incentives: Actor withdraws economic and/or political rewards from the 
                                conflicting parties, or from one of the parties, with the expectation to 
                                change the parties’ behavior, and the course of the conflict. 
B5-Power mediation: Third parties impose a solution on a conflict in order to enhance 
                           their national or institutional interests. Pressing the conflicting parties to 
                           reach an agreement through the use of force or competitive tactics.  
B6-Military intervention: Actor military intervenes to stop or change the course of an 
                                         already existing conflict. 
Table 1, Beriker 2007:25-26 
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It should be noted that the framework is part of a bigger one, which incorporates 
the conflict resolution field with peace, security, and diplomatic studies in an attempt to 
present a tool-box for foreign policy actions for international actors. However, for the 
purpose of this research only the part of the framework which refers to third party’s 
intervention is used.  
 
The importance of this framework is that “it articulates foreign policy behavior of 
states with the analytical tools that the conflict resolution field and the peace studies 
tradition offer” (21). The international relations field offers a tremendous amount of 
theories regarding international conflicts and suggests tools to the parties, namely states 
and institutions, to execute their foreign policy and prevent or settle a conflict. Regardless 
the vast amount of research, most of the times there is no distinction between the acts of a 
state which has a partisan role and a state which acts as a third party. On the other hand, 
CR and peace studies field address the issue of the third party intervention in a 
conflicting situation, without, however, integrating it into practical instruments of foreign 
policy.  
 
Due to the fact that the EU is an international actor, which has operations all over 
the world, any decision for intervening in a conflicting situation is a foreign policy 
decision for it. It is, however, important to examine this policy from a CR perspective, 
thus by using the third-party intervention literature. Few studies from the CR field 
address the EU’s roles, as a third party, as foreign policy tools (Eralp&Beriker:2005, 
Celik&Rumeleli:2006). This study aims to be a valuable input in the literature.  
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2.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
2.2.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
 
The question addressed in this thesis is: “What conflict resolution instruments did 
the EU used in the post-conflict Croatia and FYROM and what type of intervention is 
that”? The objective of this study is to give an analytical and in detailed description of all 
the activities that EU engaged in and all the mechanisms it used in the post-conflict 
environment of those two countries. More specifically, 1995-2006 in Croatia’s case and 
2001-2006 for FYROM. Furthermore, I will analyze them, according to Beriker’s 
framework, a partial framework as explained in the previous part, that I use and compare 
the intervention between the two cases.  
 
The fact that the last decades the EU is more active in conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding, it has created many institutions to deal with these issues and has adopted 
new policies which show its commitment to conflict resolution triggered my interest. I 
believe that since the EU wants to improve its conflict resolution capabilities, it needs 
research which analyze that. Furthermore, the conflict resolution filed also needs to 
address this issue and provide the EU with the relevant theoretical background in order 
for the organization to become more effective. 
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2.2.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
The primary focus of the thesis is to examine a little understood issue or 
phenomenon, to develop preliminary ideas and move toward refined research questions 
by focusing on the “what” question (Newman, 2006:33). Yin (2003:5) agrees that “what” 
questions can be either exploratory or about prevalence (when surveys or archival 
analysis is favored). Since the goal here is to develop pertinent hypotheses and 
propositions for further inquiry, this is an exploratory research. Concerning its time 
dimension, it is a case study, and more specifically, a multiple-case study, in which a set 
of features will be in depth examine during a period of time (Newman, 2006:40). 
According to Yin (2003) the scope of a case study research is to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon, when the researcher has limited control over behavioral 
events 
Furthermore, since my question focuses on an in depth examination of two cases 
over duration of time, my work is a comparative case study. I consider this method as the 
most appropriate because it will make my research more compelling and will give a more 
general picture of the phenomenon under examination (Herriott, Firestone as cited in Yin, 
2003:46). Cases should be selected in such a manner so that they either predict similar 
results or produce contrary results, but for predictable reasons (Yin, 2003:47). 
Furthermore, the universe from which the cases are to be selected should be well defined 
such that the cases to be compared come from the same class or universe of cases 
(Druckman, 2005:211).  
  
The cases I chose to analyze are Croatia and FYROM; thus my research falls 
under the first category.  Both countries emerged after the 1991 dissolution of the 
Republic of Yugoslavia, which held together different ethnic groups; both faced wars 
between the government-majority of the population and minority populations. Croatia 
experienced a long war, 1992-1995, between Croatians and Serbs. Today Serbs are the 
10% of Croatia’s population. In FYROM’s case, no full scale and long-lasting war 
occurred, but, nevertheless a bloody and destructive conflict emerged, between the 
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government and the Albanians, who today consist the 35% of the population. Both 
countries are candidates for EU membership: Croatia since 2004 and FYROM since 
2005, however, the EU has opened the accession negotiations with Croatia, but not yet 
with FYROM.  
 
This thesis examines the EU’s intervention in the post-conflict environment of the 
two cases, which is 1995-2006 for Croatia and 2001-2006 for FYROM, as mentioned 
previously. There are, however, some clarifications that need to be done regarding these 
periods. In 2001 both countries were included in the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP), a program designed for the Western Balkans in order to prepare them for 
future integration into the EU. That means that from that point both countries are 
potential members and the EU helps them in order to meet the relevant criteria and join 
the EU. For FYROM, its post-conflict period coincidences with a pre-accession period, 
as defined by the SAP, while for Croatia its post-conflict period could be separated into 
1995-2001 period, and 2001-2006 which is both a post-conflict and a pre-accession 
period.   
 
Even though for the EU the help that both countries receive through that program 
is part of their pre-accession assistance, in this thesis we treat that help as a mechanism 
for third party intervention. Regardless, however, the nature of the SAP the EU at the 
same time uses a variety of other tools to intervene in the countries. As will be seen from 
the presentation and analysis of the data, there is a plethora of EU’s intervention actions, 
which are not related to the SAP.  
 
 
 
2.2.3. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
A case study’s strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence, such as 
documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations (Yin, 2003:9, Hamel, Dufour, 
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1993:41). For this thesis the primary data I collected came from different sources: official 
documents and reports from various EU institutions; news reports; from NGOs and from 
EU official web-pages. The data are presented in the 5th chapter, based on their source 
and chronologically. 
 
  In the 6th chapter each instrument used by the EU for intervening in the post-
conflict environment of Croatia and FYROM, presented in the 5th chapter, will be 
evaluated according to the framework adopted for this thesis. As a result, at the 
conclusion of the chapter it will be clear which instruments did the EU use and in which 
degree.   
 
The following chapter presents the structure of the EU, which is important in 
order to have a good sense of the various institutions, organs, committees, and offices, 
which comprise the EU’s make up. Furthermore, it would be impossible to present the 
various EU activities, which come from different institutions, and understand their 
relationship, without introducing firstly the EU. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
  
The EU is neither a state nor an international organization. It is, however, a global 
economic actor, with state features and responsibilities (Farell, 454). With the Treaty of 
the EU, Maastricht Treaty (1991), the EU has a three pillar structure. The 1st pillar 
represents the old European Community (EC) and it’s mainly concerned with the 
common market, common agricultural, social, industrial policy, as well as with the 
management of relations with third countries. The 2nd pillar is devoted to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which will be analyzed later in this chapter. Finally, 
the 3rd pillar is related to justice and home affairs.  
 
The three major EU institutions are the European Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. Each of them consists of many other units 
while there are some more EU institutions and bodies, such as the European Central 
Bank, the Court of Justice, etc. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present in detail the 
whole EU structure. What is important for this thesis is to present those institutions which 
are related to conflict resolution and/or to the Western Balkans. The presentation will be 
based on the three main EU institutions: the European Commission, the Council and the 
Parliament.  
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3.1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
The European Commission is the executive institution of the EU, which proposes and 
implements the EU legislation. Furthermore, it monitors the implementation of the EU 
Treaties. It consists of 27 Commissioners, one of each member state. It implements its 
external relations through five Directorates-General: external relations, trade, 
enlargement, development and humanitarian aid. The European Commission has a broad 
set of tools for long and short term prevention, which are presented below.  
 
 
1. DG External Relations (DG RELEX): 
 
The DG RELEX “contributes to the formulation of an effective and coherent external 
relations policy for the European Union, so as to enable the EU to assert its identity on 
the international scene”.2 It works closely with other Directorates-General, mainly 
EuropeAid, DGs Development and Trade and ECHO. Furthermore, it is responsible for 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (an EU policy towards its neighbours aiming to 
build an environment of common values) and manages EU’s relations with other 
countries all over the world. Under this DG a number of specialized units and policies, 
related to conflict resolution, have been created. These are the following:    
 
 
1.1. Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management 
 
Conflict prevention is one of the main areas of work of the DG RELEX. The 
means of the prevention of conflicts for the EU are various: development co-operation 
and external assistance, trade policy instruments, social and environmental policies, 
                                                 
2 Web pages citations hereafter will be referenced in numerical order at the foot of the page. 
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/external_relations/general/mission_en.htm (13/02/2007) 
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diplomatic instruments and political dialogue, co-operation with international partners 
and NGOs, as well as the new instruments in the field of crisis management. 3 
 
The main framework under which the DG works for the prevention of conflicts 
was adopted in 2001 and it is called EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts (Göteborg Programme). The Programme highlights the importance of early 
warning and increased cooperation in international level in order to address violent 
conflicts in the most effective way. Based on this framework the EU has developed a 
number of policies and instruments for the prevention of conflicts, described below. 
 
The EU draws even more attention to conflict prevention by referring to the 
conflict cycle. It defines the various measures it can undertake for conflict prevention 
both in situations where the country seems stable but there are sources of potential 
conflict and in tense situations as well as in open conflict situations or in post-conflict 
situations, where it offers civilian and military crisis management and post-conflict 
stabilisation, as well as long term reconstruction and development.4 
 
 
1.2. Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) 
 With these papers the EU systematically checks the risk factors, based on the 
conflict indicators that the EU has developed. Briefly, these indicators are: legitimacy of 
the state, rule of law, respect for fundamental rights, civil society and media, relations 
between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms, sound economic management, 
social and regional inequalities and geopolitical situation.5 After the analysis of a 
situation the EU uses the Conflict Prevention Guidelines, in order to decide how to 
intervene to a conflict, what instruments to use and where to target.  
                                                 
3 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cm.htm (13/04/2007) 
4
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/conflict/conflict_cycle/index_en.htm (13/04/2007) 
5
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm (13/04/2007) 
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1.3. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
Established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the CFSP’s objectives are defined as 
following: 
• safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity 
of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter ;  
• strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;  
• preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter , including those on external 
borders  
• promote international co-operation;  
• develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.6  
The Commission has a broad contribution to the CFSP, however, its work is 
implemented by other EU institutions, such as the European Council and the European 
parliament.  
 
1.4. Conflict Prevention Partnership 
 Just a year ago, the EU in cooperation with four NGOs, established the Conflict 
Prevention Partnership, which aims to improve the European Union's conflict prevention, 
crisis management and peacebuilding capacities.7 
 
                                                 
6
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm (13/04/2007) 
7 Conflict prevention partnership. Available at: http://www.conflictprevention.net/ (13/042007) 
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1.5. Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) 
 
 The RRM allows the EU to act quickly for the needs of countries under the risk of 
a conflict or suffering from a natural disaster. The RRM can be deployed in cases of a 
“crisis or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to law and order, the security and 
safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to 
destabilise the country”. It does not include humanitarian help and it is not geographically 
restricted. It can be deployed during different stages of a conflict; for the prevention of it, 
for crisis management and in a post-conflict environment.8  
 
 The RRM does not act just on order to provide humanitarian aid, as ECHO. It 
aims to maintain and rebuild social structures necessary for political, social and economic 
stability. Thus, the EU through the RRM pursued specific political goals. The first two 
years of its function, 2001-2003, there have been 22 cases of deployment around the 
world (Rummel, 2004:17).  
 
 
1.6. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
 
Through the ENP, created in 2004, the EU offers its neighbours “a privileged 
relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and 
human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable 
development)”.9 It applies in the following countries: Algeria, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, 
the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. In order for those countries to 
meet the objectives of the policy, the EU provides them with financial and technical 
assistance. The ENP is closely related to the European Security Strategy and works 
closely with the High Representative for the CFSP and the Special Representatives, 
                                                 
8
 European Union. European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/rrm/index.htm (13/042007) 
9
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm 
(13/04/2007) 
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described in following parts of this chapter. By tackling issues of governance, lack of 
development, etc. the ENP is an indirect EU tool of conflict prevention. It should be 
highlighted that the ENP does not offer EU membership. If any of the countries covered 
by the ENP applies for membership in the future this procedure would be totally 
different, unrelated to the ENP. For the EU agreements with third countries is very 
common, even countries with no clear immediate membership potential, which cover 
political relations, development and co-operation assistance, trade, research, and cultural 
co-operation. These agreements are part of the conflict prevention and crisis management 
strategy of the EU. 
 
 
1.7. Cross-cutting issues 
 
 The Commission participates in many international activities, such as the 
Kimberley Process, which aims to eliminate the diamond conflicts and the Ottawa Treaty, 
against landmines.   
 
 
1.8. Non-proliferation and disarmament10 
 
 The EU has a firm position against the weapons of mass destruction and 
participates in many multilateral treaties and conventions to ban or to minimize the 
recourse to and development of them.  
 
 
1.9. Sanctions and restrictive measures 
 
Sanctions are “an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature which seeks to 
bring about a change in activities or policies such as violations of international law or 
                                                 
10
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/npd/index.htm (25/04/2007) 
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human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles. 
Restrictive measures imposed by the EU may target governments of third countries, or 
non-state entities and individuals (such as terrorist groups and terrorists). They may 
comprise arms embargoes, other specific or general trade restrictions (import and export 
bans), financial restrictions, restrictions on admission (visa or travel bans), or other 
measures, as appropriate”.11 Sanctions are part of the EU conflict prevention and crisis 
management policy and EU’s main experience in that field is the case of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, 1998-2000.  
 
 
 
1.10. Human Rights and Democratisation Policy 
 
 The EU has not just been built upon the principles of democracy, liberty, respect 
for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, but has also made these 
principles necessary precondition for every potential new member. The “Copenhagen 
criteria”, the criteria that every country has to fulfil in order to become an EU member, is 
probably the best proof of the importance of the human rights for the EU. The 
instruments that the EU uses in order to promote human rights and democratisation are 
many.  
 
EU election assistance and observation; the EU human rights forum, through 
which EU cooperates with NGOs for the strengthening of the civil society; the European 
Master Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation; the active role in the UN 
Commission on human rights; support to the International Criminal Court and other 
criminal tribunals. Furthermore, it advocates for the abolition of the death penalty and 
fight against human trafficking. It promotes the prevention of torture and emphasizes the 
importance of the rehabilitation of victims; it promotes the rights of the child; it protects 
                                                 
11European Union, European Commission. Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/index.htm (25/04/2007) 
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and promotes the rights of the minorities; as well as the rights of indigenous people and 
people with disabilities.12  
 
 
2. DG Enlargement 
 
For the EU, enlargement is regarded as a very powerful tool to transform countries 
into well-functioning democracies. Since the establishment of the European Economic 
Community, in 1957, 5 enlargements have taken place, the largest of which was the 2004 
enlargement, when 10 countries joined the EU (the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 
2007 is regarded as part of the 2004 5th enlargement).13 On October 3rd, 2005 the EU 
opened the accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey. FYROM has also the status 
of the candidate country, without, however, having started the accession negotiations. 
FYROM’s and Croatia’s accession history will be presented in detail in the historical 
chapter of this thesis. All the rest countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia including Kosovo) are potential candidate 
countries.  
 
Every country which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law can apply for EU membership. 
Accession, however, can only follow if the country fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, which 
were set up in 1993. Especially for the Western Balkans the EU has established the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), as the framework which will lead them to 
the EU. “The SAP is based on a progressive partnership, in which the EU offers a 
mixture of trade concessions ( Autonomous Trade Measures), economic and financial 
assistance (CARDS Programme) and contractual relationships ( Stabilisation and 
                                                 
12
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm (25/04/2007) 
13
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/index_en.htm (25/04/2007) 
  33 
Association Agreements) in order to help the countries transit to a market economy, 
promote regional cooperation and the prospect of EU accession”14.  
 
 
2.1. European Agency for Reconstruction 
 
The European Agency for Reconstruction is the organization which manages the 
EU’s assistance to the Republic of Serbia (including Kosovo), the Republic of 
Montenegro and FYROM. Established in 2000, the agency is governed by the Council 
and the European Parliament and overseen by a Governing Board composed of 
representatives from the 25 EU Member States and the European Commission.15 The 
European Commission funded projects, which the agency implements, are designed to 
help the countries come closer to the EU, by facilitating the development of the market 
economy, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting institution building.  
 
 
 
3. DG Development 
 
The DG Development defines its mission as following: “help to reduce and 
ultimately to eradicate poverty in the developing countries through the promotion of 
sustainable development, democracy, peace and security”.16 Among other intervention 
areas, special concern is given to human rights, democracy and conflict prevention in 
close cooperation with the DG RELEX. It manages EU’s relations with the 71 ACP 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and the 20 Overseas Countries and Territories. 
A typical conflict prevention or management response mechanism of the GD is the 
                                                 
14 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu
/sap/index_en.htm (25/04/2007) 
15
 European Agency for Reconstruction. Available at: http://www.ear.eu.int/agency/agency.htm 
(25/04/2007) 
16
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/About/Mission_en.cfm (25/04/2007) 
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suspension of aid to counties ruled by autocratic regimes and not fulfilling the political 
dimension of the development and cooperation agreements.17  
 
 
4. DG European Aid-Cooperation Office 
 
The European Aid (or EuropeAid) is an implementing organization for both the 
DG RELEX and DG Development. More concretely, the European Commission’s 
external aid, managed by the two DG mentioned above, is given through EuropeAid. This 
EU external assistance is delivered in seven main areas: water, food, health, education, 
prosperity, freedom and security in order to fulfill essential needs of human life. 18 
 
 
5. DG European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 
 
ECHO is the world’s biggest contributor in humanitarian aid. The European 
Union’s mandate to ECHO is “to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims 
of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. The aid is intended to 
go directly to those in distress, irrespective of race, religion or political convictions”.19 
 
 
6. DG Trade 
The Directorate General for Trade promotes prosperity, solidarity and security in 
Europe and around the world based on EU’s trade policy.20 The connection of this DG to 
                                                 
17
 “EU crisis response capability revisited”, Crisis Group Europe Report N.160, 2005, available in 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/160_eu_crisis_response_capability_revisited_edit.pdf 
Accessed at April 20th, 2007 
18
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/promotion/sectors/sectorslist_en.htm (20/04/2007) 
19 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/presentation/mandate_en.htm (20/04/2007) 
20
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/whatwedo/work/index_en.htm (20/04/2007) 
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conflict resolution emerges form the promotion of European values, such as democracy, 
rule of law, through trade agreements.  
 
 
7. European Commission Delegations 
118 Delegations exist in third countries and 5 at centers of international organizations 
which: 
• Present, explain and implement EU policy;  
• Analyze and report on the policies and developments of the countries to which 
they are accredited ;   
• Conduct negotiations in accordance with a given mandate.  
The importance of the Delegations is big, because they have a key role in the EU’s 
external assistance, especially in close cooperation with the EuropeAid. They also have 
an increasing role in the conduct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and they 
provide assistance to the High Representatives, the Secretary-General of the EU council 
and the Parliament, described below.21 
 
3.2. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
 
The Council is made up by the ministers of the member states and can take nine 
different configurations depending on the subject under examination. They are the 
following: 1) general affairs and external relations, 2) economic and financial affairs, 3) 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, 4) employment, social policy, health 
and consumer affairs, 5) competitiveness, 6) transport, telecommunications and energy, 
                                                 
21 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/delegations/intro/role.htm (25/04/2007) 
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7) agriculture and fisheries, 8) environment and 9) education, youth and culture.22 The 
Council has been especially active in the field of conflict resolution, by advancing 
civilian capabilities and by focusing on diplomacy and political dialogue, through the 
High Representative and the Special Representatives. The various conflict resolution 
policies are below presented.  
 
 
1. General Affairs and External Relations Council 
 
This Council deals with the whole of the Union's external action, including CFSP, 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Foreign Trade and Development 
Cooperation.23 Part of the ESDP is various military, police and civilian operations, which 
have taken place, or are still active, in the Balkans, Africa, Asia, South Caucasus and the 
Middle East. The political and military structures which implement the ESDP policies are 
the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the EU Military Staff, all described below.  
 
2. Secretary General of the Council / High Representative of the CFSP (SG/HR) 
Appointed by the Council and receiving his orders from the foreign ministers, he is 
supported by the newly established Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Javier 
Solana is in that position since 1999 and has been a key figure in EU’s crisis management 
and conflict prevention policy, due to the fact that he became involved in many cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The council of the European Union. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=427&lang=en&mode=g (25/04/2007) 
23
 The council of the European Union. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=388&lang=en (25/04/2007) 
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3. Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPU) 
In general, the unit has the following tasks: "monitoring and analysing 
developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; providing assessments of the Union's foreign 
and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future; 
providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations...including 
potential political crises; producing...argued policy options papers...as a contribution to 
policy formulation in the Council..."24  
 
4. European Union Military Committee (EUMC) 
 The EUMC is responsible for all EU military activities. It is composed of the 
Ministers of Defense of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their 
permanent military representatives. It develops the overall concept for military crisis 
management, provides risk assessments of potential crises, analyses the military 
dimension of a crisis situation and maintains military relations with non-EU NATO 
members, other states and organizations, including NATO. 
 
5. EU Military Staff (EUMS) 
The EUMS “performs early warning strategic planning and situation assessment”. 
It is a General Directorate within the Council General Secretariat. It is the only 
permanent integrated military structure of the European Union. 
Established on 11 June 2001, the EU Military Staff receives tasks from the 
EU Military Committee (which represents the Chiefs of Defence of 
all the Member States). 
                                                 
24
 Schneckener, U. (2002): “Developing and applying EU crisis management. Test case Macedonia”. P.20. 
Available in http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_14.pdf. Accessed at 23 April 2007  
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The EUMS provides in-house military expertise for the Secretary-General/High 
Representative (SG/HR). The main operational functions of EUMS are: 
 early warning,  
 situation assessment, and  
 strategic planning.  
A new body within the EUMS, with effect from January 1st, 2007, is the EU 
Operations Centre, which will strength EU’s capacity for conflict management. 25 
 
4.   Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) 
 
Established on 2000, the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management’s priority areas are 
the following: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian 
administration and civil protection. The Committee identifies possible missions, defines 
the capabilities needed and calls for contributions.26 
 
 
5. Political and Security Committee (PSC)  
The PSC’s main functions are “keeping track of the international situation, and 
helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its 
political control and strategic direction”.27 
More concretely, its aim is to: 
                                                 
25
 The council of the EU. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1039&lang=en&mode=g (25/4/2007) 
26
 The council of the EU. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=278&mode=g&name (25/4/2007) 
27
 The council of the EU. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=279&lang=EN&mode=g (25/4/2007) 
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 monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP);  
 contribute to the definition of policies;  
 monitor implementation of the Council's decisions.28  
 
6. EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) 
 
The European Union currently has nine Special Representatives (EUSRs) in different 
regions of the world (the Middle East, the Great Lakes, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, the South Caucasus, Moldova, 
Central Asia and Sudan). The EUSRs promote EU policies and interests in troubled 
regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and 
the rule of law. They play an important role in the development of a stronger and more 
effective EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and in the EU's efforts to 
become a more active, more coherent and more capable actor. They provide the EU with 
an active political presence in key countries and regions, where they are to a large extent 
a "voice" and a "face" of the EU and its policies. 29  
 
The importance of the Special Representatives is that they “are stationed in the field, 
have a certain standing and authority to speak for and act on behalf of the Union, and in 
the right circumstances are able to perform a variety of functions ranging from 
information gathering and dissemination to mediation” (ICG report, 2005). The Special 
Representatives, together with the High Representative and the President, are responsible 
for conducting the political dialogue between the EU and third countries. Political 
dialogue is a key EU instrument for crisis management.30 
 
 
                                                 
28
 EUROPA. Available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/political_security_committee_en.htm 
(25/04/2007) 
29
 The council of the EU. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=263&lang=EN&mode=g (25/04/2007) 
30
 European Commission (2003). Civilian instruments for EU crisis management. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/cm03.pdf (25/04/2007) 
  40 
7. European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 
 
The Council is responsible, as mentioned above, for the EU’s foreign policy 
towards third countries. Within its relation with the Western Balkans the EUMM has 
been established, the primary objective of which is “to contribute by its activities 
(information gathering and analysis), in line with directions from the Secretary 
General/High Representative and the Council, to the effective formulation of the 
European Union policy towards the Western Balkans”. 31 
 
 
8. European Security Strategy (ESS) 
 
The EU perceives itself as a global actor in security and peace and has developed the 
ESS, December 2003, in order to identify the five key threats for Europe today: terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons, regional conflict in neighbouring countries, state failure and 
organized crime. ESS urges the EU to develop further its conflict prevention potential, 
based on a mixture of political, diplomatic, military, civilian, trade and development 
activities. Moreover, it highlights the importance of the civilian resources in crisis and 
post-crisis situations.32 In 2004 the European Council set the Civilian Crisis Management 
Headline Goal for 2008 (being able to conduct various types of monitoring missions as 
well as to provide support to Special Representatives; being able to conduct concurrent 
civilian missions at different levels of engagement; lastly, being able to provide an 
effective response across the full range of tasks in conflict prevention and civilian crisis 
management).33 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 The council of the EU. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=622&lang=EN&mode=g (25/04/2007) 
32
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/the_eu/index_en.htm (25/04/2007) 
33
 The council of the EU. Available at: http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st15/st15330-
re03.en04.pdf (25/04/2007) 
  41 
 
3.3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
The European Parliament is the only EU institution, the members of which are 
directly elected by the citizens of the EU. It has co-legislation power, with the Council of 
the EU, budgetary authority, again together with the Council, and exercises supervising 
control over other European institutions. Furthermore, it has advising, to the Council, role 
about the Common Foreign and Security Policy and has set the human rights as a top 
priority.    
 
These three institutions, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, are the 
main institutional base of the EU. As it is clear from the above presentation, each of these 
units consists of many other bodies, which most of the times, cooperate very closely. This 
inter-institutional cooperation is of great importance for an affective EU conflict 
resolution and crisis management. While the SC/HR, with the help of the various units 
under the Council, mainly uses diplomatic tools, engages and mediation and political 
dialogue, and launch military or civilian operations, the Commission strengthens this 
work by offering financial assistance and long-term commitments.  
  
 
 
3.4. LITERATURE REVIEW ON EU’S CONFLICT RESOLUTION POTENTIAL 
 
 
Since the beginning of the European community, there has been a close 
relationship between three types of ambition: the development of Europe into a 
significant international actor; an independent security and defense profile; and 
promotion of the European integration process (Bretherton and Vogler, as cited in Olsen, 
2002: 87). In becoming a major global actor, the EU has invested a lot on its capabilities 
of conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution. According to Rummel 
(2004) EU’s focus on conflict resolution comes both from its failure to prevent the 
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violent conflicts in Yugoslavia and in Africa in mid-’90s and also as a reaction to USA’s 
domination worldwide in crisis management.  
 
The EU has been actively involved in conflict prevention, crisis management, and 
peacebuilding in the last decades, as part of its attempt to become a global actor. The EU 
itself reveals its commitment to conflict prevention and resolution and to peacebuilding 
by “addressing the root-causes of violent conflict, including poverty, degradation, 
exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak 
governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality. Also promotes dialogue, 
participation and reconciliation with a view to promoting peace and preventing outbreaks 
of violence”. 34 It also presents the various measures it uses both for structural long-term 
and direct short-term action: democracy programmes, election monitoring, conflict 
prevention in human rights programmes, efforts in rule of law, good governance, security 
sector reform, de-mining, combination of political dialogue and trade, development and 
external assistance, civilian and military crisis management capabilities, the Special 
Representatives and other diplomatic instruments, co-operation with international 
partners and NGOs.35 
 
Peacebuilding is a new area of action for the EU, however of great importance. 
EU’s peacebuilding efforts cover a broad range of areas, such as: “peacekeeping 
operations, peace processes, peace negotiations and reconciliation efforts; 
Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR); anti-mine 
action; Security Sector Reform (SSR); civilian administration and good governance; 
democratisation; strengthening of the rule of law; justice reform; ensuring respect for 
human rights; children-related post-conflict assistance; institution building; independent 
media and truth commissions; facilitation of the transition from crisis situation to normal 
cooperation; addressing degradation and exploitation of natural resources; tackling 
proliferation of small and light weapons; trade related measures; targeted economic and 
                                                 
34
 The council of the EU. Available at: http://www.eplo.org/documents/CP-Presidency-Report06.pdf 
(25/04/2007) 
35
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp.htm (25/04/2007) 
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other measures such as relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction operations and development 
assistance”.36  
 
Rummel (2004) is very critical on the EU’s conflict prevention capabilities. The 
European Union is both a pioneer of and a latecomer in conflict prevention, he argues. It 
is a pioneer because it has advanced the idea of conflict prevention among the European 
nation states. However, it is not yet well enough equipped to reliably assume 
international security tasks. In addition, as one of the world's major donor organizations, 
the Union has obtained the image of a humanitarian superpower. Thus, the Union’s weak 
record in managing conflicts, in defending itself and establishing violence-free zones 
outside of Europe is all the more astonishing. In order for the EU to become more 
effective in conflict prevention, according to Rummel, conflict prevention should be 
anchored in the new Constitutional Treaty as a goal and task; efficiency in decision 
making should be ensured through qualified majority voting; and actions should be 
supported by a foreign minister (1-3). Eavis & Kefford (2004:4) believe that EU focuses 
mainly on crisis management policies, while it should attach attention to long-term 
preventive actions.   
 
 The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO, a platform of European 
NGOs, networks of NGOs, and think tanks active in the field of peace-building, who aim 
to promote sustainable peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the European 
Union) through its reports recommends to the EU, in order for its conflict prevention 
abilities to become more effective, to: a) explicitly make conflict prevention a goal of the 
EU in its Treaty; b) focus and address the root causes of a conflict; c) improve the 
coordination among the different actors of the foreign policy (Commission, Council, 
member states); d) advance the decision-making process, so as the enlarged EU can act 
decisively in CFSP matters; e) incorporate further conflict prevention to trade and 
development policies; f) increase early warning capacity and ensure that this will be 
translated into recommendations and action; g) assure that there are enough budgetary 
                                                 
36
 The council of the EU. Available at: http://www.eplo.org/documents/ECsupportPBjune06.pdf 
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provisions for both long-term and short-term preventive action; and h) increase its 
engagement with civil society and NGOs.37  
 
The literature emphasizes the variety of the conflict prevention measures available 
to the EU (Hill: 2001). For Barbe & Johansson (2001) the EU’s objective for conflict 
prevention is the “structural stability”, which means sustainable economic development, 
democracy and respect for human rights, vialable political structures and healthy 
environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without 
resorting to conflict. Other stresses the importance of the membership offered to third 
countries as a conflict prevention measure. “EU’s most important tool for conflict 
prevention is the offer of membership” (ICG report, 2005:37), because it motivates 
significant changes in areas identified by the EU as important to conflict prevention, 
especially rule of law and democratic institutions.  
 
In Hettne & Soderbaum’s view (2005) the EU is mainly a civilian power, which 
promotes values, such as social pluralism, the rule of law, democracy, market economy, 
etc, rather than use militaristic and hard foreign policy. Cooper (2004) agrees with them 
about the civilian capabilities of the EU, which rely on law, negotiation and multilateral 
organizations, in contrast to the hard to the USA’s hard power, but at the same time he 
highlights the complementation of the two; “hard power begets soft power”, in his words 
(12). Joseph Nye, who introduced the term soft power as the ability to obtain the outcome 
one wants by attraction and persuasion, and not by coercion, recently introduced the term 
“smart power” to define the ability to combine hard and soft power (2006).  
 
It had been said above that the EU is the world’s biggest humanitarian donor. This 
detail has been also mentioned in the literature (Olsen: 2002, Youngs: 2004) in order to 
show that military intervention is not the first option for the EU. Another feature of the 
EU conflict resolution strategy is democratic institution building.  For Youngs the EU 
shows a growing commitment to the emerging conflict resolution mechanism called 
institution-building over time; however, he points out the “lack of guidance between 
                                                 
37
 The council of the EU. Available at: http://www.eplo.org/documents/ConvPaperfin.pdf (25/04/2007) 
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conflict resolution imperatives and particular types of strategy towards institution 
building and the failure of the EU to move from emergence crisis management to 
engaging in democratic institution building (p.531). Dwan urges the EU to develop 
further its civilian capabilities for three reasons. Firstly, because civilian crisis 
management lays at the core of human security-based approach to global security. 
Secondly, because in this area the EU can make the difference worldwide and thirdly, 
because till now the EU has devoted itself to non-military actions, so it should try to 
improve them (p.2).  
One of the most common used terms in the literature is the term 
“Europeanisation”, as a conflict settlement and resolution tool (Ladrech: 1994, Olsen: 
2002, Radaelli: 2003). Radaelli defines Europeanisation as a set of “processes of (a) 
construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies” (p.30). In short, domestic changes caused by 
domination of EU’s norms (Delanty, Rumford, 2005:6).  
 
Radaelli also offers the five mechanisms of Europeanisation: 1) models: provision 
of legislative and institutional templates, 2) money: aid and technical assistance, 3) 
benchmarking and monitoring, 4) advice and twinning and 5) gate-keeping: access to 
negotiations and further stages in the accession process. For Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) 
the mechanisms are three: institutional compliance, changing domestic opportunity 
structures, and framing domestic beliefs and expectations. 
 
Noutcheva et.al. (2004) were the first who linked Europeanisation with 
secessionist conflicts.  Furthermore, they make the distinction between EU as a player 
and EU as a framework in conflict resolution.  “EU as an active player” can affect 
secessionist conflicts by using positive and negative incentives in order to push for a 
settlement. In its second dimension, “EU as a framework”, it can serve as a framework of 
governance, it can inspire constitutional and other changes, contributing indirectly to 
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conflict settlement and conflict resolution. Finally, they refer to the difference that exists 
between Europeanisation as a conflict resolution method within the EU and in its 
periphery.  
 
After having seen the conceptual background of this thesis, thus the CR literature, 
the framework which will be used in the research and the literature regarding EU as a 
third party, it is necessary to make both a historical retrospection of the former 
Yugoslavia and a description of the conflicts witch arose after its dissolution. Since this is 
not a historical thesis, I do not intend to present in detail the history of Yugoslavia. On 
the contrary, my aim is to present briefly, but accurate, in the next chapter this part of the 
history. My emphasis is on the evolution of the conflicts that the two countries faced, 
necessary for continuing with EU’s instruments of intervention after the settlement of 
those conflicts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
During the 6th century the South Slavs, on their expansion to the south, crossed 
the Danube and reached even the Aegean coast. Soon later they settled in the Balkan 
Peninsula and some parts of these populations established their political organizations. 
The Serbs had their own medieval state, as well as the Croats. The South Slavs were 
bordering with the Byzantine Empire and the Hungarian kingdom, however gradually, 
and especially after the Christianization process, they established relations with the 
Byzantium. The Christianization of the South Slavs took place in the 9th century.  
 
Castellan (1991) argues that 1365 was a turning point in the history of the Balkans 
signifying a new era for the peninsula. In that year Murat A’, the Ottoman Sultan, 
transferred the capital of his empire to Andrianopole. Until 1481 the conquest of the 
Balkans, by the Ottomans, had gradually been completed. The Battle of Kosovo, 1389, in 
which the Ottomans defeated the Serbs, paved the way for Ottoman predominance in the 
Balkans. The medieval principalities in what are today Serbia, FYROM, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina succumbed to the Ottoman Empire. Most of today’s Croatia was an enclave 
area between two major forces; the Muslim Ottoman and the Christian Europeans. 
Croatia was part of the Kingdom of Hungary and later the Austrian and Austia-Hungarian 
empires for almost 800 years. The Ottoman and Habsburg empires fragmented the 
territory, thus, separating these populations from each other; they remained so until the 
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end of the World War I and the formation of the first Yugoslavia, within which the South 
Slavs were united for the first time. 
 
The South Slavs under Ottoman rule, as well as the rest of the Balkans, enjoyed a 
large degree of autonomy, through the Ottoman millet system. A millet consisted of 
members of a faith; thus, there were five millets in the territory of the Ottoman Empire: 
the Muslim, the Orthodox Christian, the Armenian, the Roman Catholic, and the Jewish. 
Since the majority of the South Slavs living within the Ottoman Empire were Orthodox 
Christians, they were, for most of the time, under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of 
Constantinople. Even though the Muslim population of the empire was in a more 
privileged position, regarding its status and tax burden, divisions also existed among the 
Christian population: between populations in the countryside and urban settlements, as 
well as among different ethnicities. Greeks, for instance, were generally in a better 
position within the Orthodox Millet, since they were dominating the Orthodox Church 
and usually they had better occupations, such as tax-collectors and traders.  
 
At the beginning of the 19th century, major independence movements in the 
Balkans attained a large degree of success. In addition to the worsening situation that 
arose due to the gradually decline of central authority and local Janissaries, already by the 
end of the 18th century, many people living abroad had been affected by the liberal ideas, 
and technological advances of Western Europe. The conditions were favorable for 
rebellions by the Ottoman Christians. Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania were the 
first independent countries established at that period.  
 
At the same time similar ferments took place in the Habsburg Empire. As in the 
case of Ottoman Empire, different ethnic groups were under the control of the Habsburgs. 
Among them, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs, were influenced by the rising independence 
movements of the South Slavs in the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the 19th 
century, in opposition to rising Hungarian nationalism, a group of Croatian intellectuals 
introduced the idea of the unification of the Slavs within the Habsburg Empire, such as 
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Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Ukrainians. This movement is known as 
the Illyrian movement.38  
 
In 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created. Within the 
kingdom Croatia gradually lost much of its autonomy, which they had enjoyed in the 
Hungarian and Austrian empires, and felt aggrieved by the Serb dominance (Bideleux, 
Jeffries, 2007: 189).The kingdom changed its name into Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. 
It was at that time the only multiethnic state in the Balkans. It was a democratic, but 
extremely centralized state. Under that name it lasted until 1941, when the Axis powers 
invaded and conquered the country, dividing it into several entities. The so-called 
Independent State of Croatia was particularly active in the war on the side of the Axis 
powers, while within the country atrocities on massive scale occurred against the Serbs.   
   
With the end of the Second World War, the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was 
created, by the victorious communist guerilla movement of Josip Broz Tito. It consisted 
of six socialist republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro 
and Macedonia, and two autonomous regions; Kosovo and Vojvodina. Josip Broz Tito 
was the lifetime head of the country; he was at the same time president, prime minister, 
president of the Communist league, and supreme commander of the armed forces. In 
order to handle the ethnic tensions which had risen during the WW II, Tito gave to the 
state a federal structure. The Federal Republic was directed by a Presidential Council, 
whose chairmanship was rotated among the heads of the republics and the autonomous 
regions. 
 
Until the end of ‘60s even though the republics had a great degree of autonomy, 
they felt left aside by the Serbs’ dominance in the federation. The Serbs too, in spite of 
their dominant position, felt victimized by the federal structure, which established the 
equality of all republics, while the Serbs believed that due to their historical past, as they 
were the first to rebel against the Ottomans and the first to establish an independent state, 
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 “The ancient term Illyria was firstly used by Napoleon, to designate Croatian and Slovenian lands that he 
wished to mold into a single administrative unit” (Lampe, 1996:41). 
  50 
they should have a stronger position. The tensions between the republics grew over the 
time and maybe the most characteristic and most important incident was the “Croat 
Spring”, in 1967. Among others, Croatians demanded the recognition of their language as 
different and equal to the Serbian and in general they challenged the federal structure of 
the state. The movement was, however, suppressed by Tito.   
 
With the 1974 constitution, the federal organization of the state changed its 
structure. The republics were given more responsibilities in the fields of political, 
economic, social, and cultural life. In the late 1970’s, tensions among the republics were 
further exacerbated by the deteriorating economic situation in the country. Despite these 
problems, Tito managed to keep all ethnic communities loyal to the Yugoslav state. 
Yugoslavia enjoyed considerable international esteem. Its citizens enjoyed a relatively 
high standard of living and considerable personal freedoms, especially compared to other 
communist regimes (Detrez, 2002: 199).   
 
The founding peoples of Yugoslavia were Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, 
and Montenegrins, and, after the constitution of 1963, Muslims (in the sense of a political 
community, not a religion) were recognized as a nation. These six republics of the 
federations were based on the recognition of the nations as historical –territorial 
communities. In addition, there were many ethnic minorities’ citizens, some of whom had 
national homeland elsewhere, such as Jews, Hungarians, Italians, Bulgarians, etc. The six 
federal units had administrative and budgetary autonomy over their economies, 
education, and culture. Borders were drawn upon historical treaties and political 
negotiations of the period between 1944 and 1947 period and large parts of the country 
were ethnically mixed (Woodward, 1995: 31).  
 
Various scholars have different opinions regarding the reasons of Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution.  Some have argued that deep, historical ethnic and religious divisions were 
the reasons of the collapse. These scholars believe that it was only Tito’s leadership 
which kept these ethnic tensions under control, and that upon his death the underlying 
divisions surfaced (Kruhonja, Ivanovic&Stanic in van Tongeren et al. 2002).  
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Many other historians, however, have an opposite opinion. According to this 
view, the country was not held together by Tito’s charisma, political dictatorship, or 
repression of national sentiments. It was held together by a complex balancing act at the 
international level and an extensive system of rights and overlapping sovereignties 
(Woodward, 1995:45).A period of harsh austerity, budgetary conflicts, and an economic 
policy aimed at westernization to reduce trade deficits and foreign debts, during the ‘80s, 
led to challenges of the constitutional base of the federation. Each republic was willing to 
push for political changes, in order to pursue its economic interests. During 1988-1989, 
the conflicts, over economic resources and political authority, within and between 
republics as well as federal authorities began to escalate. The end of the federation came 
in 1990, with the collapse of the federal communist party (League of Communists) and 
the first multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia. However, the collapse did not open 
a democratizing process, in the sense of establishing procedures of managing conflicts 
peacefully (Woodward, 1995:79-145).  
 
Bennet (1995) also does not believe that animosities among the Yugoslavians are 
so deep. He accepts that there is a historical dimension in the conflicts which erupted in 
the 1990s’, however, “popular perceptions of the past are more important than what may 
or may not actually have taken place. Moreover, “those perceptions are based not on the 
works of respected historians, but on the Yugoslav media” (p. 6). Finally, he points out 
that Slobodan Miloševic, the media and Tito’s regime, which couldn’t adapt to the new, 
primarily economic, world developments are the main reasons of the collapse. For 
Detrez, it was the media, nationalism (often used by specific leaders who appeared in the 
political arena with the multiparty system), economic differences, some intellectuals, the 
churches and various diasporas that hold a key role in Yugoslavia’s collapse.  
 
The disintegration of the federation did not happen peacefully for a number of 
reasons; the Miloševic regime in Serbia; the lack of democratic structures and a 
democratic transition; and no clear, authoritative voice opposing war. The Orthodox and 
Catholic Churches abstained from trying to contribute to a non-violent transition of 
society; independent media were virtually non-existent; and last, but not least, the attitude 
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of the international community in the early stage of the conflict favored the parties opting 
for war (Kruhonja, et al. 2003:250). The map shows the countries which established after 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution.  
 
 
Map 1: Map of the countries created after the dissolution of Yugoslavia39                                                             
 
 
 
Presenting the historical events is not sufficient in order to understand the creation 
and dissolution of Yugoslavia, as well as the ethnic wars that followed. At this point, it 
would be useful to highlight the importance of the formation and development of identity 
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perceptions among the Serbs and Croats and the Slav Macedonians and Macedonian 
Albanians and how those perceptions and self-perceptions affected their relationship after 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia.  
 
The first case is the ethnic war in Croatia between the government and the Serb 
minority, after Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Croats and Serbs coexisted within Croatia for 
centuries in peace and it would be impossible to understand the reasons of the war 
without referring to their perceptions of themselves and of the other. As seen from the 
above analysis, the fact that today’s Serbia and Croatia were for a long period of time 
parts of different empires greatly shaped their identities. Furthermore, these identities 
were not hostile to each other in the 19th century. At that time being a Serb meant being 
not a Turk or a Muslim, and the primary focus of conflict for the Serbian state was the 
opposition of Austria to its ambitions. Similarly, to identify oneself as Croat was to take a 
stance in relation to the claims of Magyars or Austrians (Allcock, 2000:329-333). It was 
only in a united Yugoslavia that Serbs and Croats gradually developed antagonistic 
relationships. 
 
The differences between Croats and Serbs are related to myths and shared 
memories about their own common origins and ancestries, although, both nations belong 
to the Slav group of nations. Moreover, minor regional differences, including religion 
(confessional differences), languages and cultural traditions, played a key role in the 
development of their antagonistic identities. (Isakovic, 2000:72-73). For instance, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church claims to be the sole defender of Orthodoxy against Islam’s 
expansion from the East and Catholicism’s from the West, whereas Croats perceive 
themselves as the border between the Ottomans and the Europeans.  
 
Their identities had been not hostile to each other, as long as nationalistic 
politicians had not been involved, in the 20th century. However, during the developments, 
that followed Tito’s death, and after the break-up of Yugoslavia both the Croatian and 
Serb Republics were under the rule of politicians which manipulated self-perceptions and 
perceptions of the other and built upon them (through several mechanisms, such as the 
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reproduction of narratives about the historical competition between these ethnic groups) 
in order to achieve their goals. More specifically, such politicians by underlining the 
supposed incompatibility, exclusiveness and, even, the antagonistic character of these 
identities, they prompted the citizens to perceive ethnic insecurities and, thus, to give 
support to extreme nationalists. Competition between extremists shifts the political and 
social interest from the median policy to an extreme one and consequently political and 
social life becomes a centrifugal game (Reilly, 2002). The developments that took place 
after the dissolution of Yugoslavia are examples which illustrate the above assumption. 
 
The second case under examination in this thesis is the crisis in FYROM in 2001, 
between the government and the Albanian minority. The Macedonians40 were recognized 
as a different ethnic group with the establishment of the second Yugoslavia, after the 
Second World War. Before that, the area of what is known today as the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia was part of Serbia and later part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes. Although after the break-up of Yugoslavia thre were no significant armed 
conflicts in the country, in 2001 a major crisis erupted between the government and the 
Albanian minority.  
 
Due to the Macedonian question the attitudes of the Albanians, as well as 
Serbians, Greeks and Bulgarians towards FYROM is very different, as Engstrom points 
out (2003). Serbia’s position is very ambiguous. Although, within the second Yugoslavia 
the Yugoslav government promoted the national consciousness of the people, in the past, 
and even now in some scale, Serbs regarded the area as their territory and the people as 
Serbs by origin. The Bulgarian perception of the Macedonians41 has historically been that 
the Macedonian people originate from the Bulgarian nation and that the Macedonian 
language is simply a dialect of Bulgarian. Greece, in turn, opposes the use of the name 
‘Macedonia’ to any other place than what to them is Macedonia, namely, northern 
Greece. Finally, neither Albania, nor the Macedonian Albanians oppose the existence of a 
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 Explanation regarding the disputable use of the terms “Macedonia”, “Macedonian”, etc. is given in a 
following part of this chapter.  
41
 Explanation regarding the disputable use of the terms “Macedonia”, “Macedonians”, etc. is given in a 
following part of this chapter. 
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Macedonian nation; they are, however, again a constitution which would define the 
country as the country of the Slav Macedonians only, who are the majority.  
 
With the establishment of FYROM, the new state had to be protected not only 
from external threats, but also from within the country. While the Slav Macedonians 
wanted the country to be a national state of the Macedonians, in which other ethnic 
groups would have equal rights, the Albanians were challenging that, and demanding a 
bi-national state in which the Albanian minority would be recognized as a constituent 
nation, alongside the Macedonian nation (Engstrom, 2003). What the Macedonian 
Albanians were demanding for the preservation of their identity, the Slav Macedonians 
perceived it as a threat to the security of the state. Since their existence was challenged by 
many neighboring countries, the right to a state of their won was seen as vital by the Slav 
Macedonians, however, “the more Slavic Macedonians assert their cultural identity, the 
more ethnic Albanians feel the need to assert theirs, leading to a vicious circle” 
(Ackermann, 2000: 66).   
 
This historical and cultural background set the backdrop for the conflicts of the 
1990s. Transmitted though myth and nationalist histories it gave the initial impulse for 
the antagonisms that led to the violent conflicts that arose in the 1990s and which will be 
discussed through two case studies in the following chapters.   
 
 
  
4.1. CROATIA 
 
 4.1.1 THE CONFLICT BEWTEEN CROATS AND SERBS  
 
Croatia, as well as the other republics of former Yugoslavia, was a multiethnic 
society. The majority of the population has been the Croats, while the Serbs have been 
the largest minority. Tensions between the two communities gradually rose and escalated 
after WW II and after the independence of the republic they led to a long, bloody war. In 
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this war in Croatia, which will be now described, parties were the Croatian police and 
military on the one side and the local Serbs of Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav army 
and paramilitary troops of Serbia on the other. It is necessary to make clear that both 
Croats and Serbs are citizens of Croatia, but of different ethnic origins.42  
 
The first multiparty elections in Croatia took place on April 22 and May 6, 1990 
and the HDZ of Franjo Tudjam won the elections. The rhetoric of the party was quite 
nationalistic, mainly anti-Miloševic and anti-Serb (Kruhonja et al. in van Tongeren et al. 
2003:250, Goldstein, 1999:220). For instance, Tudjman’s government was responsible 
for media campaigns against the Serb minority, purging Serbs from key occupations, 
ordering imposition of Catholic instruction in all of Croatia’s state school, etc. This 
concerned the Serbian minority of Croatia, which not only did not participate in the new 
government, but also asked, through referendum, for the autonomy of the Serb-inhabited 
areas of Croatia (northern Dalmatia and the eastern part of Lika), and the areas where 
Serbs were not the majority (eastern and western Slavonia). From that time gradually the 
tensions between Croatian government and Serbs became violent, with the Yugoslav 
army interfering to support the Serbs. 
 
The situation escalated more after Croatia declared its independence on 25 June 
1991 with a referendum in which 83.6% of Croatians voted for their independence. At the 
same time 99% of the Serbs of Krajina voted in favor of remaining part of Yugoslavia. 
By the end of the year the Serbs gained control of nearly one third of the country. During 
this time, the Serbs created the Republic of Serbian Krajina in central and northeastern 
Croatia. With the international recognition of the country in January 1992 a cease-fire 
was signed. However, at that time 30% of Croatia’s territory was under Serbian control 
with the support of the Yugoslav army. This led to polarization and mutual intolerance 
between the Croats and Serbs within the part of Croatia still under control of the Croatian 
government, and frequent human-rights violations against Serbs including, illegal 
evictions, firings, harassment, and physical assaults (Kruhonja, et al. in van Tongeren et, 
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 An ethnic community is a “named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, 
and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity” (Smith in 
Brown, 1993:28-29).  
  57 
al. 2003:250-251). As a result, international negotiations placed the area under a United 
Nations peacekeeping force, the UNPROFOR. 
  
In January 1993, Croatian army crossed the dividing line of the Serb-occupied 
territory in Krajina, and for the next two years the fighting did not stop, even though it 
did not escalate into a full war. In the mean time, another war has broken out; in Bosnia, 
between Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Both Croatia and the Serbs of Croatia involved in 
the war by supporting one of the groups, which led to new tensions between them in 
Croatia. In 1995, Croatia, which had upgraded its army, launched several offensives, such 
as “Operation Flash” and “Operation Storm”, and achieved the recapturing of a big area 
of Krajina. By the end of the summer, Croatia had taken over all Krajina territory from 
the Serbs. Some 200,000 Serbs fled to Serb-held areas of Bosnia or to Serbia. According 
to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), during those 
offensives, the Croatian army had carried out “ethnic cleansing” and generals Ante 
Gotovina, Mirco Norac and Ivan Cermak were indicted.  
 
In November 1995 Croatia and Croatian Serbs signed an agreement regarding 
Eastern Slavonia. The area would return in Croatia’s control after a transition of two 
years. The Dayton agreement reached in the same month, between Bosnia, Croatia and 
Serbia, brought a general peace to the region. With the Dayton agreement, Serb-held 
eastern Slavonia and Montenegrin-held Prevlaka peninsula were returned to Croatia; 
Croatian refugees could return to their homes in eastern Slavonia; and Serb refugees 
could return in their homes in the Krajina or elsewhere in Croatia. Eastern Slavonia 
returned to Croatian control in January 1998, after a two-year transition period, but 
despite Croatian efforts to guarantee the respect of human rights, till March 1998, almost 
half of the Serbs had fled the area (Ramet, 1999:291). By the end of the wars of 1991-
1995, 220,000 ethnic Croats and more than 300,000 Serbs has been displaced.  
 
Tudjman won a second five-year term as president with the elections of 1997. 
During the time of his second government, Croatia faced an international isolation. It was 
excluded from NATO’s Partnership for Peace, it lost the economic and technical 
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assistance coming from the EU, and was excluded from the fifth enlargement process of 
the EU. Due to Tudjman health problems new elections took place in 2000, from which a 
coalition government came to power with Racan as the new president. New elections 
took place in 2003; since then the prime minister of the country has been Ivo Sanader.     
 
 
4.2.2 CONFLICT RESOLUTION ATTEMPTS BY THE 
         INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
 
 The international community failed to recognize the indicators of the upcoming 
crisis, such as the proposals of Slovenes and Croats to redefine Yugoslavia’s constitution, 
the fact that Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia started to arm for self-defense, etc. The voices 
of those who were warning for the future events were not heard and when the wars 
started the international community was neither ready to react not unified.  
 
At a period when the European Community’s (EC) members were more 
concentrated in the upcoming Maastricht conference and the CFSP was not even on paper 
yet, the first responses to the Yugoslavian crisis were unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to 
maintain Yugoslavia’s entity. In March, 1991, the EC declared: “Yugoslavia could have 
expectations with respect to its association with the Community if its territorial unity and 
integrity are safeguarded. Any other attitude could jeopardize internal frontiers in 
Europe” (Nuttall, 2000:195). Two months later EC Foreign Ministers agreed that they 
could not accept any unilateral declaration of independence, because that could not be a 
solution.  
 
However, as the situation escalated, the EC tried to prevent further escalation and 
resolve the conflict through diplomatic means. In July 1991, the Brioni Conference took 
place in which representatives of the Yugoslav republics negotiated a solution and a 
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cease-fire, under the assistance of the EU representatives.43 In September 1991, another 
EC conference began; the Conference on Peace on Yugoslavia. President of the Peace 
Conference was Lord Carrington. Between September 7 and December 15, the EC 
mediation centered on its peace conference; the shuttle diplomacy of its chairman Lord 
Peter Carrington; and the drafting of a constitutional document on Yugoslavia’s future 
that could be presented for negotiations to representatives of the republics and parties in 
conflict. The problem was that “Carrington’s mandate was ambiguous about its political 
objective and competing political principles, inconsistent in its declarations as a result of 
internal conflicts, and unwilling to commit military forces to a situation it had prejudged 
as aggression by one party against another” (Woodward, 1995:179). The conference was 
replaced one year later by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, led by 
an EU and an UN envoy. 
 
These diplomatic efforts to find a solution before the conflicts escalated further 
did not achieve much, due to the lack of any leverage. It is important to notice that the EC 
at the time was lacking a common policy among its members, it could not deploy troops, 
and more concerned with the Maastricht negotiations. Furthermore, the EC did not have 
any experience in managing such a complex crisis. The EC imposed arms embargo on all 
Yugoslav Republics in July 1991, and the UN Security Council followed on September 
of the same year. EC’s recognition of Croatia came with the skeptic that international 
recognition would signal international protection to all conflicting parties and would 
bring a quick end to the war (Woodward, 1995:147). This measure, however, was also 
unsuccessful.  
 
In addition to EC’s efforts, a word should be said of UN’s involved in the 
conflict, mainly by deploying peacekeeping units. In September 1991, the UN imposed 
arms embargo against Yugoslavia, and a month later appointed Cyrus Vance as a special 
envoy of the Secretary General to the area. In January 1992, a cease fire was signed. The 
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UN peacekeeping forces, UNPROFOR, were deployed in Croatia, in four areas, in 
February 1992, keeping Croats and Serbs apart. 
 
Undoubtedly, the USA’s intervention was especially crucial for the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Accords. The conference which led to the agreement took place in 
November 1995, with the participation of the presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. 
The chairman of the conference, the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke used all his 
power in order to make the parties agree on the agreement.  
 
Third party intervention in Croatia did not come only by official level, but also 
was multi-track. Many NGOs, international, regional and local worked on the civil 
society level, with peace projects, peace building and community recovery programs, etc. 
The Antiwar Campaign Croatia, The Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights, 
the Dalmatian Solidarity Committee, are only some examples of these NGOs. Finally, the 
role of NGOs in the UN peacekeeping operations shouldn’t be ignored. 
 
CROATIA: TABLE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS 
25 June 1991 
 
Croats vote for their independence, while the Serbian minority voted for 
remaining part of Yugoslavia 
End of 1991 
 
One-third of Croatia’s territory is under Serbian control 
1992 
 
International recognition of Croatia 
Cease-fire agreement, brokered by the UN 
UN sets up 4 protected areas in Croatia 
1995 
 
Croatian force retake 3 of the 4 protected areas 
Dayton Agreement is signed 
Agreement between Serbs and Croats about the 4th UN protected area 
Table 2: Croatia’s most important events 
 
4.3.3 CROATIA’S CURRENT SITUATION 
  
The Republic of Croatia is on the eastern Adriatic coast facing Italy. It is in the 
north-west of the Balkans, bordered by Slovenia, Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country is inhabited mostly by Croats (89.9%). There are 
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around twenty minorities, Serbs being the largest one (4.5%) and others having less than 
0.5% each. The predominant religion is Catholicism (87.8%), with some Orthodox 
(4.4%) and Sunni Muslim (1.3%) minorities. The official language of the country is 
Croatian. Lastly, Croatia is a Presidential, multi-party parliamentary democracy.  
 
Diplomatic relations between the EU and Croatia were established in 1992. The 
year 2000 is a turning point for EU-Croatia relations, since the change of leadership in 
Croatia, marked a new, progressive and encouraging political climate and supported 
stronger relations with the EU.44 In 2001, the country was included in the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP). The SAP is specially designed for the countries of the 
Western Balkans in order to prepare them to join the EU in the future, after having 
fulfilling their obligations. A more detailed description of the SAP will follow in the next 
chapter. What is important for now is to point out the new phase of the EU-Croatia 
relations with signing the SAP. 
 
Croatia presented its application for EU membership on 21 February 2003. The 
European Council of 16/17 December 2004 decided that accession negotiations would be 
opened on 17 March 2005, provided that there was full cooperation with the UN 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY). 
However, in the absence of confirmation of full cooperation, the Council on 16 March 
2005 decided to postpone the opening of accession negotiations. The negotiations were 
finally opened on 3 October 2005, after a positive assessment of the ICTY Chief 
Prosecutor that cooperation was now full.45 The country is expected to become an EU 
member state in 2009 or 2010.  
 
According to the Commission, the main political issues facing the country relate 
to the need for further progress on questions such as the reform of the judiciary and the 
                                                 
44 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://www.seerecon.org/croatia/documents/depliantcroatie.pdf (25/04/2007) 
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 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm (25/04/2007) 
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fight against organised crime and corruption, public administration reform, minority 
rights, refugee return, the conduct of war crimes trials, sustaining full cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague and 
continued engagement in regional cooperation including the need to solve outstanding 
bilateral issues with its neighbours. In addition to continuing with the necessary political 
and economic reforms, Croatia will, in order to make progress in the accession 
negotiations, need to focus efforts on the substantial work that lies ahead in terms of 
adopting EU legislation and building the administrative structures and capacity necessary 
for its correct enforcement.46    
 
In terms of economic issues, Croatia is already considered to have a functioning 
market economy as advanced and stable as some existing EU member states. The 
Commission has recognized the country's efforts to achieve a considerable degree of 
macroeconomic stability with low inflation.47 Furthermore, according to the Commission 
the country has stable democratic institutions and there are no major problems as regards 
the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. Croatia's treatment of minorities (as 
stipulated in the Copenhagen criteria) is, however, seen as problematic. During the 1992-
1995 war, 300.000 ethnic Serbs fled Croatia. The return of these refugees is one of the 
conditions for Croatia to achieve its EU bid. To date, over a third of them have returned. 
However, their accommodation is a very serious problem. Many of the former Serbian 
houses are now occupied by those Croatian refugees, who fled Bosnia during the war. 
And not always a friendly atmosphere welcomes the returning Serbs. The EU considers 
Croatia’s treatment of minorities, as stipulated in the Copenhagen criteria, as 
“problematic” (Karpat, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
The parliamentary and presidential 
The year 2000 represents a historic turning point in the 
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4.3. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA  
 
 4.3.1. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SLAV MACEDONIANS AND 
                     MACEDONIAN ALBANIANS 
 
Before continuing to describe the conflict some clarifications are necessary 
regarding the conflicting use of the terms “Macedonian”, “Slav Macedonians” or 
“Macedonian Slavs”. Since the independence of the country, there is an on-going dispute 
with Greece, regarding the use of the term “Macedonia”, “Macedonian”, as well as for 
the use of the Star of Vergina in the country’s flag. Greece, which seeks exclusivity of the 
term in viewing its origins from ancient Macedonia and Alexander the Great, opposes the 
use of these terms by FYROM, interpreting them as claims of FYROM’s over Greek 
historical heritage. The official name of the country is the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and under this name it is accepted as a candidate country in the EU. For that, I 
also use that name when I refer to the country. However, in the literature the country is 
referred to as Macedonia, and the language and the people as Macedonian language. 
Since part of my work is to refer to the literature, in this thesis I will use the term 
“Macedonians” to refer to the people of the country, as it is used in the literature, without 
taking a position in the conflict with Greece, which is out of the scope of this thesis.  
 
Furthermore, there is a considerable dispute over the use of terms “Slav 
Macedonians” or “Macedonians Slavs”. According to Bideleux & Jeffries (2007:406), the 
Macedonian-speaking Slav citizens of FYROM should be called Slav(ic) Macedonians. 
Otherwise, if they are called just Macedonians, it would be implied that they have a more 
privileged position in the country, compared to citizens of other ethnicity. I adopt this 
position and use the term “Slav Macedonians” to refer to the majority of the citizens of 
the country, while the largest minority are the Albanians, people of Albanian origins, but 
citizens of FYROM.  
 
After having made these clarifications, I can continue with the description of the 
conflict. FYROM is a unique case, because it is the only former Yugoslav republic which 
succeeded avoiding a full scale war after the dissolution. Even though it is located in a 
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geographical area full of ethic tensions which led to bloody wars, and has conflicting 
relations with Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, it is true that it is one of the most successful 
examples of conflict prevention. The problems in FYROM, however, between the two 
largest ethnic groups, the Slav Macedonians and the Albanians, originate even before the 
’80s.  
 
The first elected president of the country was Kiro Gligorov, elected in 1991. 
After the elections, on 9 September 1991, three-quarters of the country’s citizens voted in 
favor of independence. According to a census held in March 1991, 65% of the republic’s 
population was Slavic Macedonians and 20% Albanians. In the next census in 1994, not 
much has changed. The Albanian political parties were, however, challenging the results. 
On October 1991 the new Macedonian constitution was adopted but renounced by ethnic 
Albanians, because it privileged the Slavic Macedonians, the Macedonian language, and 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The Albanians held a referendum in January 1992, in 
which 99.9 % of those participating voted for the creation of the “Republic of Ilirida” in 
the western part of the country.  
 
Between February and August 2001, an armed conflict between ethnic Albanian 
extremists (UÇK) and FYROM’s army escalated step by step from small-scale local 
violence in the region around the borders with Kosovo up to the brink of a full-fledged 
civil war, affecting large parts of the country. Unttill that time the most crucial crisis that 
the country faced was in March-June 1999, when about 360,000 ethnic Albanians 
refugees from Kosovo fled in the country. Although they departed shortly after the war, 
soon after, Albanian radicals on both sides of the border took up arms in pursuit of 
autonomy or independence for the Albanian-populated areas of the Republic. 
 
Basically, three interrelated factors contributed to the crisis. First, the 
international concern Macedonia had attracted since the early 1990s decreased 
significantly. The post-conflict management in Kosovo and, later, the events in Belgrade 
(change of regime in October 2000) absorbed most of the international and European 
attention. Second, the most serious external problems for Macedonia had been resolved, 
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in particular the relations to Greece and to post-Miloševic-Yugoslavia had improved; 
thus, the domestic interethnic conflict had no longer to be contained by the political elites 
because of potential threats from outside. Third, and most importantly, at the same time 
the end of the Kosovo war increased the opportunities for ethnic Albanian militants to 
act. (Schneckener, 2002:30).  
 
For Ackermann (2000:60) the Albanians grievances fall into four categories: 
group status, language rights, educational rights and discriminatory practices. 
Furthermore, she (1999) argues that much of the conflict between ethnic Albanians and 
Macedonians is fuelled by mistrust and misperception between the two ethnic groups, 
and the fact that they constitute two distinct societies with different traditions, customs, 
cultures, and religions. What continues to drive ethnic tensions in FYROM are distinct 
grievances on the part of ethnic Albanians, not all of which have been sufficiently 
addressed in the various negotiation forums set up between the international 
organizations in the country and the representatives of the contending groups.  
 
On 22 January 2001 a police station in a village called Tearce was attacked by a 
self-propelled rocket grenade. The next day, an organization, called National Liberty 
Army (NLA), claimed responsibility for the attack. A number of various, small-scaled 
incidents, have been reported, before the eruption of the violence, in March, 2001, in 
Tetovo. On 10 March 2001 the rebels presented their demands: 1) a new Macedonian 
constitution which would state that Macedonia is a state of Macedonians and Albanians, 
as well as of minorities, like the Serbs, the Roma and others; 2) better rights for 
Albanians, including the recognition of the Albanian language as a second official 
language of the country; 3) international mediation and 4) a state funded university.48 On 
March 21 the rebels were given a 24-hour deadline to lay down their weapons or face a 
full-scale offensive. The offensive began on 25 March and after 4 days the government 
announced it success.  
 Till July the number of the internal displaced persons had reached up to 150,000. 
The conflict had escalated so much that not only members of NLA but also ethnic 
                                                 
48
 BBC News. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1224776.stm (25/04/2007) 
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Albanian civilians were also fighting. Due to the international response, civil war was 
avoided. A framework, proposed by EU-USA, was accepted by the two Macedonian 
parties of the government but rejected by the two Albanian parties. While both parties of 
the conflict were negotiating with the help of the international community, the military 
operations continued. After many ceasefires and many deadlocks of the negotiations, the 
conflict ended on 13 August 2001, with the Ohrid Agreement.  
 
The agreement was signed by the four political parties of the country. Ethnic 
Albanian armed groups would voluntarily surrender their weapons to NATO and disband, 
while the parliament – dominated by the ethnic Macedonian majority – adopted a series 
of constitutional amendments and two laws granting ethnic Albanians substantially more 
rights and local authority, as well as an amnesty for fighters who had disarmed (ICG 
report, 2001). The main points of the agreement were: cessation of violence, preservation 
of Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, use of albanian language, 
proportional presentation of Albanians, ethnic minorities’ increased voting capacity in 
parliament, development of civil society, respecting the ethnic identity and interests of all 
Macedonian citizens (Baros, 2003:71). Finally, the Ohrid Agreement called upon the EU 
to coordinate the efforts of the international community in facilitating, monitoring and 
assisting implementation of the Agreement. However, key aspects of the implementation 
of the accord are still lacking, according to Stefanova (2003, 179), such as the use of the 
Albanian language in the parliamentary committee sessions and the long agreed-upon 
regional decentralization. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION ATTEMPTS BY THE 
          INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
In 1991 the European Community (EC) established the Arbitration Commission 
of the Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, as mentioned before. The EC 
assisted the new state with substantial financial as well as humanitarian aid. FYROM was 
rapidly integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures after the country joined the NATO 
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"Partnership for Peace" programme and, subsequently, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council in November 1995. 
 
The first international intervention in FYROM, before the crisis erupted, was the 
deployment of the UN preventive diplomacy force, from 1993 to 1998. The operation 
was called UNPROFOR till 1995, and after that to the end, UNPREDEP. Its aim was to 
monitor FYROM’s borders with Albania and Yugoslavia. The mission’s mandate was not 
extended after 1999, despite its successful mission, due to a veto from China.  
 
Although the UN worked closely with the OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje, it 
seemed to lack any initiative for ending it; UN’s role was largely confined to reporting on 
refugee movement and humanitarian issues (Grimond as cited in Baros, 2003:71). 
OSCE’s role, which started as monitoring and reporting, eventually changed to a more 
active one. For instance, the OSCE sent High Commissioners on National Minorities in 
the country. The OSCE undertook various initiatives to improve interethnic relations 
through its long-term mission in Skopje (since 1992) and several visits of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, who from time to time acted as a facilitator in 
disputes on education or language (Schneckener, 2002:24). 
 
After the outbreak of violence in 2001, the EU, NATO, and other institutions 
worked for the stability of the country. Heads of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions 
paid many visits to the country. The EU appointed Francis Leotard as its special 
representative, while for the same reason the United States appointed James Pardew. 
Both’s interaction with President Trajkovski resulted, among others, in many changes in 
FYROM’s constitution.  
 
The early stages of the crisis, March, April 2001, are characterized by an intense 
“shuttle diplomacy”, made by the HR, Mr. Solana with the help of his special 
representative in the country. The EU “urged the government to avoid further escalation 
through its large-scale counter-offensives and to start a dialogue on political reforms with 
the elected Albanian parties instead” (Schneckener, 2002:35). The SAA, which was 
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signed during the crisis period, was the most powerful incentive in the hands of Solana 
for pressuring the parties agree on a cease-fire. However, the management of the crisis 
was not long-lasting. By the end of April the fighting resumed and this time not just in 
the military level. At that point EU together with NATO representatives undertook a 
mediator’s role and convinced the parties to create an all-parties government. In order for 
a peaceful solution to be achieved, the EU offered further financial aid packages. For the 
first time in the summer all international actors involved, EU, USA, NATO and OSCE, 
were able to combine their efforts and propose a Framework Document (7 July). This 
was the base of the Framework Agreement, signed by the parties on August 13.  
 
Piana (2002) emphasizes that the successful management of FYROM’s crisis was 
due to three reasons: firstly, EU’s policy, which, compared to previous conflicts in the 
Balkans, was more straightforward; secondly, non of the neighboring countries supported 
the Albanian guerillas; and thirdly, FYROM’s government can be considered as 
relatively moderate, compared to governments that were in power during the previous 
wars in other ex-Yugoslav countries.   
 
Second track intervention in FYROM, mainly through NGOs, was quite rich, 
compared to the country’s size. Several international NGOs have been conducting 
projects in FYROM, most often in the field of interethnic relations, reconciliation and 
tolerance, promoting peaceful coexistence, citizen involvement in creative positive social 
changes, etc. Some of these NGOs are the following: Nansen Dialogue Center, 
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, Search for Common Ground, 
UNICEF.  
 
The FYROM: TABLE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS 
9 September 1991 
 
The majority of the country’s citizens voted for their independence 
October 1991 
 
New constitution adopted by the government, but renounced by the 
Albanian minority 
1993-1998 
 
Deployment of UN preventive force 
January 2001 
 
Armed conflict between the government and Albanian extremists 
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April 2001 
 
Stabilization and Association Agreement 
August 2001 
 
Ohrid agreement 
March-August 2001 
 
Shuttle diplomacy by the EU, NATO, OSCE and USA 
Table 3: FYROM’s most important events 
 
 
4.3.3. CURRENT SITUATION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV 
          REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
The country borders Serbia to the north, Albania to the west, Greece to the south, 
and Bulgaria to the east. The largest ethnic group in the country is the Slavic 
Macedonians. They represent 64.2% of the total population. Approximately 500,000 
inhabitants are declared as Albanians, representing 25.2% of the population. They are 
concentrated mostly in the western and north-western part of the country. In smaller 
numbers, many other minorities exist, which account for less than 2.5% of the population 
of the country. The majority of the population belongs to the, unrecognized, Macedonian 
Orthodox Church (64.7%). Muslims comprise 33.3% of the population and other 
Christian denominations comprise 0.37%. The remainder (1.63%) is recorded as 
"unspecified" in the 2002 national census. These numbers come from the last census, 
held in 2002. In terms of the political situation FYROM is a parliamentary democracy. 
The unicameral Parliament is composed by 120 members elected by proportional 
representation from party lists in six electoral constituencies. Parliamentary elections are 
held every four years.  
 
FYROM’s official relations with the EU started in 1995 with EU recognition. The 
contractual relations of FYROM with the EU started in 1996 when it signed an agreement 
to be eligible for assistance from the EC PHARE programme. From that point and untill 
the crisis and during it the EU has helped the country, as mentioned before, mainly by 
providing humanitarian aid and through diplomacy in order to become democratic and 
stable country. In 2001 FYROM became the first country which signed the SAA, putting 
its relation with the EU in a new base. European integration became officially the goal of 
both FYROM and EU.  
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FYROM submitted an application for EU membership on 22 March 2004 and the 
Commission was asked by the European Council to prepare an Opinion on this 
application. The Commission recommended the Council grant the country candidate 
status. It was given to the country on 16 December 2005 without, however, the opening 
of accession negotiations yet. The Commission considered that negotiations could be 
opened once the country has reached a sufficient degree of compliance with the 
membership criteria. Some of the main challenges the country still needs to face include: 
- Implementing fully the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement;  
- Strengthening the rule of law, implementing the reforms in the judicial system and the 
police;  
- Upgrading the fight against corruption;  
- Pursuing vigorously the economic reforms, in particular with the aim to attract 
investment by curbing administrative red tape and creating a level-playing field for 
businesses;  
- Improving the functioning of the public administration and its capacity to implement the 
community acquis.49 
 
 
 
4.4. CASES COMPARISON 
 
 
 
The previous parts of this chapter presented in detail the two cases; the dynamics 
of the conflicts, the attempts by the international community to settle the conflicts and the 
current situation of the two countries and the status of their relationships with the EU. 
This final part of the historical background will make a short comparison of the two 
cases, based on the information given above, in which I can refer to in the conclusions. 
 
                                                 
49
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/political_profile_en.htm 
(25/04/2007) 
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Both countries established after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991; they are 
both multi-ethnic countries which faced ethnic conflicts. In 1991 the Serbs were the 12 % 
of Croatia’s population, while the Macedonian Albanians were the 21% of FYROM’s 
population. In both countries the conflicts erupted between the main ethnic minority and 
the official government. However, in Croatia the conflict was a long, bloody civil war 
which lasted for 4 years and led to the displacement of 220.000 Croats and 300.000 
Serbs, while in FYROM the conflict was an 8-month crisis in 2001, ten years after the 
independence, which did not have much causality and many civilian victims.  
 
When Croatia’s conflict erupted the country did not have any special relationship 
with the EU; it became member of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, thus a 
potential member, in 2001 and it was granted the candidacy status in 2003. Furthermore, 
when the peace agreement was singed and the country moved to the post-conflict period, 
the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding capabilities were quite new. On the other 
hand, FYROM became member of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001, 
during the crisis, and that gave the EU significant leverage to act as mediator in the 
conflict. Finally, by that time the EU had strengthen its conflict resolution capabilities; 
new policies were adopted and new institutions were established related to conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding.  
 
 There are some important differences with regard to other third parties activities 
prior and during the conflict that should also be mentioned. Before the beginning of the 
civil war in Croatia there was no intervention by the international community, in order to 
prevent the upcoming events. In the FYROM, immediately after its independence, a UN 
peacekeeping force was deployed, which worked closely with the OSCE spillover 
mission. During the conflict in both cases many third parties attempted to help the parties 
settle their conflict, such as the EC/EU, the UN, the NATO and the USA, however, in the 
FYROM these efforts are regarded as better coordinated. 
 
Finally, it worth mentioning the relationships of both countries with their 
neighbors and the disputes they are part in. Croatia has disputes with Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia and Italy mainly over border and minorities issues. Those 
disputes, however, are not as intense and prolonged as the FYROM’s disputes with 
Greece and Bulgaria, over the term “Macedonia”, and with Albania about the Albanian 
minority. For instance, due to the Greek objections, regarding the use of the term 
“Macedonia(n)”, and the embargo Greece placed on the FYROM the country was 
recognized by the EU only in 1995. The following table summarizes the comparison of 
the two cases over some key issues. 
 
COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASES 
 Croatia FYROM 
Level of violence High (220.000 Croats and 
300.000 Serbs displaced 
and refugees) 
Not so high (20 Albanian 
Macedonians and 10 Slav 
Macedonians victims) 
Duration of conflict 4 years 8 months 
Type of conflict Ethnic conflict/civil war Ethnic conflict 
Time of conflict Immediately after the 
independence 
10 years after the 
independence 
Demand of minorities Autonomy  More rights and 
a bi-communal state 
External assistance to 
minorities  
Yes, from the ex-Yugoslav 
Army  
Yes, from the Albanian 
extremists from Kosovo 
Agreement with the help of 
3rd parties 
Yes Yes 
EU’s conflict resolution 
capabilities at the time of 
the conflict 
Not so advanced More advanced 
Relation of the country with  
the EU when the peace 
agreement was singed 
No special relation  Member of the Stabilization 
and Association Process 
Third parties’ intervention 
before the conflict 
No UN peacekeeping forces 
(1992-1999) 
OSCE mission 
Third parties’ attempts to 
resolve the conflict 
UN peacekeeping forces 
EU, NATO, USA 
Coordinated efforts by the 
EU and NATO 
Relationship with neighbors Disputes with many 
neighbors, but not very 
intense 
Serious disputes with 
Greece, Bulgaria and 
Albania 
Table 4: comparison of the two conflicts 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
EU’s THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-CONFLICT CROATIA 
AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
 
 
Having a clear image of the history of the two conflicts under examination is now 
the time to present the EU’s methods for conflict prevention and conflict resolution used 
in post-conflict Croatia and the FYROM. The data come from the various EU 
institutions, reports, policies, etc. which are presented in detail in the 3rd chapter. The 
point for the moment is just to present the various conflict resolution actions undertaken 
by the EU. What type of actions are, according to the framework used, will be seen in the 
analysis chapter, which follows.  
  
 
 
5.1. CROATIA 
 
1) EUROPEAN HUMANITARIAN AID OFFICE (ECHO) 
 
1.1. 1996  
 
In Croatia, assistance was provided to refugees and displaced people (350.000), 
and special attention was given to needs of the population in Eastern Slavonia, in 
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cooperation with United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). 
Throughout the country, ECHO provided food and hygiene supplies, as well  as  basic  
medical  assistance  to  vulnerable  population  groups, displaced  and   people  otherwise  
in   need  of  assistance.  Shelter   and "winterization" programmes as well as psycho-
social assistance were continued as appropriate. However, in order to avoid chronic 
dependency on external aid, projects were managed is such a way as to ensure that only 
those in the greatest need receive aid.50 
 
 1.2. 1997 
 
ECHO managed a humanitarian aid package for the vulnerable and war affected 
refugees and displaced people.51 
 
1.3. 1998 
 
ECHO managed a package of ECU 1 million for Serbs returning to Croatia and 
for other Serbs in need there. This programme was intended to help resettle those who 
were able and willing to return to their homes, and to provide appropriate assistance for 
all those identified as being in need. The funding covered food aid, toiletries and survival 
kits for returnees, essential repairs to housing, fuel, lamps, candles and winter clothing.52 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 EUROPA, press releases. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/96/1119&format=HTML&aged=1&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en (25/04/2007) 
51
 EUROPA, press releases. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/97/410&format=HTML&aged=1&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en (25/04/2007) 
52
 EUROPA, press releases. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/98/22&format=HTML&aged=1&language=E
N&guiLanguage=en (25/04/2007) 
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1.4. 1999  
 
ECHO supported those returning home, whether they were returning to Croatia or 
leaving it. They were entitled to a 'return package' which included items for repairing 
homes, household goods, food aid and aids for income generation.53 
 
  
2) 1996-2000 ASSISTANCE 
 
Apart from the humanitarian help, provided by ECHO in this period, support was 
also given for democratization, the independent media and de-mining. A detailed chart of 
the EU assistance at that period can be found in the appendix of this thesis.54 
 
 
3) SANCTIONS 
 
14/10/2004: freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons indicted 
by International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
31/3/2004: restrictions on admission of persons who help persons indicted by the 
ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) to evade justice.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 EUROPA, press releases. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/99/676&format=HTML&aged=1&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en (25/04/2007) 
54
 European Union assistance. Available at: http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents/assist_croatia.pdf 
(25/04/2007) 
55
 European Union, European Commission. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm (25/04/2007) 
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4) EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY  
    PROGRAMME  
 
The programme assists NGOs projects for the development of democracy and 
civil society. It aims to contribute to a healthy NGO sector in Croatia, by funding projects 
related to: human rights promotion (including law reform); local administration 
(including citizen participation in local democracy); professional association 
development; rule of law promotion; development of women's rights (including gender 
equality); promotion of anti-discrimination (including ethnic minorities); protection of 
children's rights; development of civic education; application of conflict resolution 
methods; establishment of information centres (including legal advice);and support to 
media.56 
 
5) EUPOP PROGRAMME (EU RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME FOR RETURN) 
 
The main partners of EUPOP are the municipalities, as they are faced in first 
instance with the complex issue of the return process. They are selected on the criteria of 
their potential for and acceptance of return. To date there are 18 EUPOP municipalities in 
Croatia. Under this programme, reconstruction of houses goes hand in hand with 
rebuilding of health centers and schools and revival of small businesses because people 
need more that just a house in order to return.57  
 
 
6) ASSISTANCE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS,  
    1999 
 
The EU allocated 11,5 million Euros for rehabilitation of housing and associated 
infrastructures in the areas of Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, Lika and Northern 
Dalmatia, Banovina and Kordun.  
 
                                                 
56
 European Union Newsletter N. 1. Available at: 
http://www.delhrv.ec.europa.eu/uploads/dokumenti/4a087af4dc1fb74141383b5014fc983b.pdf 
(25/04/2007) 
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7) ASSISTANCE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, 
     2000 
 
The EU allocated 10 million Euros for Rehabilitation of housing and associated 
infrastructures in the areas of Western Slavonia, Lika and Northern Dalmatia, Banovina 
and Kordun.58 
 
 
8) STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH-EASTERN EYROPE 
 
Launched in 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is the first 
comprehensive conflict-prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at 
strengthening the efforts of the countries of South East Europe in fostering peace, 
democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. The Stability Pact 
provides a framework to stimulate regional co-operation and expedite integration into 
European and trans-Atlantic structures. The Stability Pact is not limited to the EU, but 
involves numerous international actors, both States and international organisations. 
Nevertheless, the EU was its main initiator and plays a leading role in it. 
 
The Stability Pact consists of three working tables: 1) democratisaion and human 
rights, 2) economic reconstruction, co-operation and development and 3) security issues. 
With the annual meetings the EU has the possibility to check the progress of Croatia on 
the return of refugees and reconstruction issues and push for more reformations if needed. 
 
Part of the Stability Pact is the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative 
(MARRI). MARRI promotes durable solutions for refugees and displacement issues in 
the Western Balkan countries. Supporting those who choose to return remains the 
primary objective through the promotion of conditions enabling sustainable returns to 
take place. These efforts are complemented with support for those who do not choose to 
                                                 
58
 Economic reconstruction and development in South-Eastern Europe. Available at: 
http://www.seerecon.org/croatia/ec/refugees/rdp2000.htm (25/04/2007) 
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return and seek to integrate elsewhere in the Western Balkans, with a particular focus on 
non-discriminatory access to basic services and the realisation of social and human rights, 
supported by data exchange.59 
 
 
9) EU EXPERTS HELP CROATIA 
 
The year 2000 was a year of radical economic and political reforms for Croatia, in 
order to come closer to the EU. The EU encouraged these reforms by sending top-experts 
for a period of two years in order to help: 
- The Croatian Government with the co-ordination, programming, managing and 
monitoring of EU financial assistance  
- The Ministry of European Integration in the law approximation proces  
- The Ministry of Crafts and Small- and Medium-sized enterprises in the development of 
a comprehensive SME support programme for Croatia  
- The Ministry of Tourism in strategic advice on privatisation of state-owned assets, 
incentive schemes for local tourism operators and capacity strenghtening measures  
- The Judiciary in legal advice, court system and case handling  
- The Ministry of Public Works  
- The Croatian government in designing a comprehensive public administration reform 
programme and training of civil servants  
- The Central Bureau of Statistics on the preparation of the 2001 population census.60 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59
 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Available at: http://www.stabilitypact.org/rt/ (25/04/2007) 
Relief Web. Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64BLAA?OpenDocument 
(25/04/2007) 
 
60
 The EU in Croatia. Available at: http://www.delalb.cec.eu.int/al/eu_in_see/regional_cro.htm 
(25/04/2007) 
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10) SUSTAINABLE EVELOPEMNT IN RETURN AREAS THROUGH CIVIL 
      SOCIETY PROJECT 
 
The project, with a budget of 700.000EUR61, lasted for a year, May 15th 2004 - 
November 15th 2005, and aimed at supporting the process of sustainable return in four 
key municipalities in the counties of Zadar and Sibenik-Knin. The project partners were 
three NGOs: CARE Austria (lead organization), ZaMirNET, GONG. The activities that 
they engaged in are the following: 
1. NGO Capacity Building Training and TA package (CARE) 
2. NGO Study Visit (CARE) 
3. Encouraging the establishment of NGO coordination mechanisms (CARE) 
4. Provision of Materials (CARE) 
5. Small Grants Scheme (CARE) 
6. Citizen's Hours (GONG) 
7. Open Parliament - Public Access To Elected Representatives (GONG) 
8. Vote for the First Time (GONG) 
9. Public Advocacy Workshops (GONG) 
10. Organising Europe Day Celebration (GONG) 
11. Local Economic and Social Development Action Planning Process (ZaMirNET) 
12. Provision of IT Materials and building IT infrastructure in local communities 
(ZaMirNET) 
13. Training in computing and use of ICT for local municipal government (ZaMirNET) 
14. Capacity Building for Village Boards and Council for National Minorities 
(ZaMirNET) 
15. Provision of IT equipment for Village Boards (ZaMirNET) 
16. Basic computing training for Village Boards and Councils for National Minorities 
(ZaMirNET) 
17. Towns/Municipal Study Visits (CARE) 
18. Inter-sectoral/Partneship Fairs (CARE) 
19. Community Web Portals (ZaMirNET) 
20. Public panels on ICT4D (ZaMirNET) 
                                                 
61
 Zamirnet. Available at: http://www.zamirnet.hr/eng/page/projekti/sdra.html (25/04/2007) 
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21. Job Search Training (live and online) (ZaMirNET) 
 
11) NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL 
      MINORITIES  
 
 
The law guarantees minority representation in local government bodies and 
creates minority councils to advice elected officials on minority rights. The law also 
promotes the use of minority languages and symbols and provides for the election of up 
to eight minority representatives to parliament. The obligation to adopt such legislation 
dates from Croatia’s 1996 accession to the Council of Europe.62 
 
 
12) ADOPTION OF REGIONAL APPROACH, 1997 
 
The European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers agreed to adopt a coherent and 
transparent policy towards South Eastern Europe. The policy lays out clear conditions 
that these countries must fulfill in order to qualify for trade, aid and deepening of 
relations with the EU. It aims to improve political stability as well as economic 
development and relations in the region. An important element of this conditionality is 
the readiness of these countries to engage in cross-border co-operation with their 
neighbors. 
 
Some of the conditions that Croatia had to apply, in order for the negotiations to 
start are: 
- Credible offer to and a visible implementation of real opportunities for displaced 
persons (including so called "internal migrants") and refugees to return to their places of 
origin, and absence of harassment initiated or tolerated by public authorities; 
- A credible commitment to engage in democratic reforms and to comply with the 
generally recognized standards of human and minority rights; 
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 Minority Rights Group International (2003). Report: minorities in Croatia. Available at:  
http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/Croatia2003.pdf (25/04/2007) 
OSCE (2002). Constitutional law on national minorities. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mc/2004/01/1918_en.pdf (25/04/2007) 
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- Absence of generally discriminatory treatment and harassment of minorities by public 
authorities; 
- Compliance with the obligations under the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia and 
cooperation with UNTAES and OSCE.63 
 
 
 
13) STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS  
 
The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is the EU’s policy framework 
for the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their eventual accession. The SAP 
pursues three aims, namely stabilisation and a swift transition to a market economy, the 
promotion of regional cooperation and the prospect of EU accession. The SAP is based 
on a progressive partnership, in which the EU offers a mixture of trade concessions 
(Autonomous Trade Measures), economic and financial assistance (CARDS Programme) 
and contractual relationships (Stabilisation and Association Agreements).64 
 
The trade provisions offered by the European Union under the trade measures 
(TMs) provide the countries of the Western Balkans with duty-free access to the Union’s 
market for practically all goods.65 
 
Through the CARDS the EU provides Croatia with economic and financial 
assistance, in order to help the country transit to a market economy, develop regional 
cooperation and finally meet the European standards and join the EU. The CARDS focus 
on these six areas: 1) refugee return, 2) trade, investment climate and social cohesion, 3) 
policing and organized crime, 4) integrated border management, 5) public administration 
                                                 
63
 Council conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing the development of the European 
Union's relations with certain countries of south-east Europe. Available at:  
http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/9704/p202001.htm (25/04/2007) 
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reform and 6) environment and natural resources. Croatia received the CARDS’ help 
from 2000 till 2004. Since 2005, with the opening of the accession negotiation, the 
country is part of the pre-accession policies of the EU.  
 
CARDS is supporting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons 
through housing reconstruction, rehabilitation of public, social and economic 
infrastructure, de-mining, and support to small and medium sized enterprises. Within this 
framework, special attention is also being given to the restitution of property.  
 
The promotion of democracy and human rights is being pursued through actions 
carried out by civil society organisations and the media. Trade is being promoted by 
support to national testing laboratories and by strengthening the Croatian Veterinary 
Service for disease control.  
 
Improvements in property registration and intellectual property rights are helping 
to boost business. CARDS is working with the World Bank and the Croatian government 
in supporting improvements in the land cadastre and registry system to cut delays in the 
process of registering land and buildings.  
 
CARDS is also helping to improve the situation in the job market through 
vocational education and employment stimulation projects, such as working with the 
Croatian Employment Service to provide labour redeployment services for redundant 
workers.  
 
Training is being provided to prosecutors and the court system is being 
modernised. New efforts are being supported in combating money laundering and the 
fight against organised crime. 
 
In the environmental field, water management legislation is being updated, 
Strategic Environmental Assessments are being conducted, and support is being given to 
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civil society active in the field of environment.66 Detailed statistics per sector of the 
annual CARDS Programmes can be found at the tables in the appendix part of this thesis.  
 
The SAA are tools which provide the formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks 
which allow the EU to work with each country to bring them closer to the standards 
which apply in the EU. The mechanisms of the SAAs themselves (from specialist sub-
committees to political level meetings such as the Stabilisation and Association Council) 
will allow the EU to help prioritise reforms, shape them according to EU models, solve 
problems, and monitor their implementation. Effective implementation of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements is a prerequisite for any further assessment by 
the EU of the country’s prospects of accession.67 
 
 
 
5.2. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
 
1) EU MILITARY OPERATION CONCORDIA 
 
 
The European Union launched a military operation in FYROM on 31 March 
2003. The operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities, which was made possible 
by the completion of work on EU-NATO arrangements. The core aim of CONCORDIA 
was, at the explicit request of the FYROM government, to contribute further to a stable 
secure environment and to allow the implementation of the 
August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement . The operation contributed to the efforts to 
achieve a peaceful, democratic and prosperous country, as part of a region of stable 
countries, where an international security presence is no longer needed. This operation 
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was completed on 15 December 2003.68 CONCORDIA is part of the ESDP civilian, 
police and military operations, launched by the Council of the EU.  
 
 
2) EU POLICE MISSION PROXIMA 
 
The European Union established an EU Police Mission in FYROM, in line with 
the objectives of the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001 and in close partnership with 
the country's authorities. The Mission, code-named EUPOL PROXIMA, was launched on 
15 December 2003. EU police experts were monitoring, mentoring and advising the 
country's police thus helping to fight organized crime as well as promoting European 
policing standards. PROXIMA was part of the European Union's overall commitment in 
assisting the efforts of the Government of FYROM to move closer towards EU 
integration. This operation was completed on 14 December 2005.69 PROXIMA is part of 
the ESDP civilian, police and military operations, launched by the Council of the EU. 
 
 
3) EU POLICE ADVISORY TEAM 
 
The EU has launched an EU police advisory team (EUPAT) in FYROM, in the 
framework of the ESDP. The launch of EUPAT follows the termination on 
14 December 2005 of the mandate of the EU Police Mission PROXIMA, launched on 
15 December 2003. EUPAT includes around 30 police advisors and support the 
development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards 
of policing. Under the guidance of the EU Special Representative and in partnership with 
the host Government authorities, EU police experts monitor and mentor the country's 
police on priority issues in the field of border police, public peace and order and 
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accountability, the fight against corruption and organised crime. The operational phase of 
EUPAT began on 15 December 2005 with duration of 6 months.70 
 
 
4) RAPID REACTION MECHANISM: CONFIDENCE BUILDING PROGRAMME 
(2001-2002) 
 
The decision for the Programme was adopted on 3 October 2001, after the 
signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The specific objectives of the programme 
were to: 
• restore the electricity supply to the conflict-affected villages of Tetovo, 
Aracinovo and areas of northern Skopje 
• ensure secure access to homes and key public buildings through clearance of 
mines and unexploded ordnance; 
• contribute to the establishment of a domestic capacity for mine clearance; 
• begin implementation of the police and judicial sector reforms provided for in 
the Framework Agreement; 
• prepare estimates for the budgetary impact of implementing the provisions of 
the Framework Agreement; 
• prepare a draft law on decentralisation to local government.71 
 
 
5) SANCTIONS 
 
11/2/2004: restrictions on admission of violent extremists challenging the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement’s principles and undermining the implementation of that 
agreement.72 
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6) SUPPORT TO RECONCILIATION 
 
In the context of reconciliation efforts, the EC deployed in 2003 in close 
consultation with the EU Special Representative, high-level policy advisors to the Deputy 
Prime Minister. The purpose was to assist him to fulfill his role in overseeing the 
implementation of the provisions of the Ohrid Agreement on equitable representation of 
minorities. This assistance amounted to € 238.800.73 
 
 
 
7) PROMOTION OF TOLERANCE IN SCHOOLS THROUGH EXTRA-
CURRICULA CTIVITIES 
 
Under the project, some 80 projects have been implemented in 20 primary and 
secondary schools across the country since November 2004. More than 900 young people 
have participated in the programme, which brings together groups of students from 
different ethnic backgrounds to initiate and run their own activities under the guidance of 
school educators and coordinators.74 
 
 
8) TRAINING OF CIVIL SERVANTS 
 
The European Union funded training for 600 young civil servants in FYROM - all 
of them from minority communities. The project supported efforts in FYROM to develop 
an efficient public administration - or 'civil service' - that sufficiently represents the 
diverse ethnic landscape in the country.75 
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9) INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION PROJECTS 
 
Several thousand schoolchildren, students and daily newspaper readers were the 
focus of five EU-funded projects launched to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation in 
FYROM.  The projects, targeting children, journalists, ordinary citizens and law students, 
were part of a wider €3 million EU-funded civil society development programme 
supporting inter-ethnic reconciliation, were introduced during an event in which Deputy-
Prime Minister Radmila Sekerinska participated.76 
 
 
10) CHILDREN’S PUPPET THEATER 
 
An EU funded project, organized by Search for Common Ground in partnership 
with Children’s Theatre Centre. The two NGOs visited 18 cities through out FYROM and 
performed three puppet plays for children between the ages of 7-9.  The dramas conveyed 
age-appropriate pro-social messages related to FYROM’s ethno-cultural diversity and 
provided new ways for children to perceive themselves in a pluralistic environment. Each 
performance was followed by a facilitated interactive dialogue between the SFCG’s 
facilitator, child psychologist or pedagogue and children in the audience – in order to 
reinforce messages from the puppet plays. 
 
 
11) SUPPORT OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
The project was funded by the EU and implemented by the Foundation Open Society 
Institute. The project’s objectives were the following: 
• To support and develop the capacities of civil society organizations, particularly 
those from economically and socially deprived areas inside the country. 
• To incite the creation of regional NGO networks. 
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• To enhance communication and cooperation between NGOs and local authorities 
as well as to appreciate the role of NGOs as monitors of the quality of governance 
and public service delivery. 
• To support and encourage the development of skills of civil society organizations, 
especially for lobbying and advocacy, and to encourage and support NGOs for 
undertaking different activities and approaches that ultimately aim at achieving 
sustainability. 
 
12) STABILITY PACT 
 
Launched in 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is the first 
comprehensive conflict-prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at 
strengthening the efforts of the countries of South East Europe in fostering peace, 
democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. The Stability Pact 
provides a framework to stimulate regional co-operation and expedite integration into 
European and trans-Atlantic structures. Among the stability pact partners is the EU’s 
member states and the European Commission, which has a leading role in the Pact.  
 
The Stability Pact consists of three working tables: 1) democratisaion and human 
rights, 2) economic reconstruction, co-operation and development and 3) security issues. 
With the annual meetings the EU has the possibility to check the progress of the FYROM 
on the return of refugees and reconstruction issues and push for more reformations if 
needed. Major Stability Pact’s initiatives in FYROM are the following: 
 
- Inter ethnic relations. 
The Stability Pact supports fYR Macedonia's attempts to improve inter-ethnic 
relations, focusing on legislation review and implementation. The non-discrimination 
legislation review by the Council of Europe aims at recommending action to bring 
legislation and practice in line with international standards. This activity runs in parallel 
with the implementation of the Framework Agreement concluded in Ohrid. 
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- Education and Youth.  
The Stability Pact promotes cultural and education programs to children, youth 
and adults with particular attention to promoting inter-ethnic relations and enhancing 
tolerance and conflict resolution skills. For instance, the Pact supports the children's TV 
program "Nashe Maalo" in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and Roma as a pilot-model of 
educational TV broadcast dealing with inter-ethnic relations.77 
 
Part of the Stability Pact is the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative 
(MARRI). MARRI promotes durable solutions for refugees and displacement issues in 
the Western Balkan countries. Supporting those who choose to return remains the 
primary objective through the promotion of conditions enabling sustainable returns to 
take place. These efforts are complemented with support for those who do not choose to 
return and seek to integrate elsewhere in the Western Balkans, with a particular focus on 
non-discriminatory access to basic services and the realisation of social and human rights, 
supported by data exchange. 
 
13) ECHO 
 
17.1. During the winter of 2001-2002, ECHO also provided food to around 
15,000 residents and returnees in the villages most affected by the conflict. This was to 
ease the return process and to prevent further displacement. Furthermore, ECHO co-
funded firewood distribution for the crisis-affected population, mainly displaced people 
living with host families and in collective centres, as well as schools and health centres in 
the conflict area. This programme brought relief to approximately 30,000 people in need. 
As soon as the crisis areas became accessible, ECHO funded emergency rehabilitation to 
the eight schools and seven health centres that had been damaged most. In spring, ECHO 
also extended the distribution of livestock feed and initiated the distribution of seeds and 
fertiliser for the villages that were most affected by the crisis. The project, for both 
returnees and residents, reached over 10,000 families in 20 villages.  
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17.2. Finally, these activities, which aimed to ease return, were strengthened with 
a confidence-building programme. ECHO funded community services and psycho-social 
activities were expanded to assist conflict-affected women and children through the work 
of mobile teams in the areas of Tetovo, Kumanovo and Skopje.78 
 
 
14) IMPROVEMENT OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS 
 
The aim of the project, implemented by the European Perspective in the period 
2003-2004, was to provide mechanisms for the improvement of inter-ethnic relations and 
reconciliation at the community, regional and state level facilitating the democratic 
stabilisation process in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian (FYROM) and 
thus the wider region. The services provided under the project are the following: 
 
a) The Establishment of three Inter-Village Councils (IVC) in three selected 
Municipalities characterized by low level of inter-ethnic relations;  
b) Training of the IVCs representatives on inter-ethnic relations issues  
c) Creation of three Inter-Village Council Documentation and Information Centers 
(IVCDIC)  
d) Identification of Inter-ethnic relations problems at the community level of the selected 
regions  
e) Research analysis based on the identified inter-ethnic relations problems to the target 
areas and provision of concrete solutions  
f) Open Dialogue on inter ethnic relations issues which will include: i) 30 awareness 
building meetings, ii) 12 inter-ethnic workshops, iii) publication of 4 inter-ethnic 
relations Newsletters, and iv) creation of the IVCDIC web-site and Network, and  
g) Realisation of Opinion Polls to identify and measure the public perception.79 
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15) HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION IN WAR AFFECTED AREAS 
 
An EU funded project, launched by the European Perspective, in the period 2001-
2004. The overall project value was 4.300.000 EUR and following services were 
provided: 
- Social assessment 
- Identification of beneficiaries 
- Establishment and functioning of a housing reconstruction committee 
- Tenders for materials and labor assistance 
- Monitoring 
- Coordination with donors 
- Coordination with government bodies.80 
 
 
16) AMNESTY LAW, 2002 
 
The amnesty law, passed on March 7, is regarded as a key to stability and peace 
and an important step to the fulfillment of the Ohrid Agreement.81 
 
17) ADOPTION OF REGIONAL APPROACH, 1997 
 
The European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers agreed to adopt a coherent and 
transparent policy towards South Eastern Europe. The policy lays out clear conditions 
that these countries must fulfill in order to qualify for trade, aid and deepening of 
relations with the EU. It aims to improve political stability as well as economic 
development and relations in the region. An important element of this conditionality is 
the readiness of these countries to engage in cross-border co-operation with their 
neighbors. 
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18) STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS (SAP) 
 
The SAP is the EU’s policy framework for the Western Balkan countries, all the 
way to their eventual accession. The SAP pursues three aims, namely stabilisation and a 
swift transition to a market economy, the promotion of regional cooperation and the 
prospect of EU accession. The SAP is based on a progressive partnership, in which the 
EU offers a mixture of trade concessions (Autonomous Trade Measures), economic and 
financial assistance (CARDS Programme) and contractual relationships (Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements).82 
 
The trade provisions offered by the European Union under the trade measures 
(TMs) provide the countries of the Western Balkans with duty-free access to the Union’s 
market for practically all goods.83 The CARDS Programme for FYROM focuses on these 
five areas:  
 
1) Democratic stabilization, especially supporting the return of refugees, and internally 
displaced persons,  
2) Economic and social development, especially promoting trade development, 
improving the investment climate and promoting social cohesion,  
3) Justice and home affairs, including modernization of justice, policing and the fight 
against organized crime, and improved border management,  
4) Administrative capacity building covering reform of the public administration, 
regional development and public finance. 
5) Environment and natural resources, supporting Croatia in upgrading its environmental 
legislation and its implementation and enforcement. Detailed statistics per sector of the 
annual CARDS Programmes can be found at the tables in the appendix part of this thesis. 
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The SAA are tools which provide the formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks 
which allow the EU to work with each country to bring them closer to the standards 
which apply in the EU. The mechanisms of the SAAs themselves (from specialist sub-
committees to political level meetings such as the Stabilisation and Association Council) 
will allow the EU to help prioritise reforms, shape them according to EU models, solve 
problems, and monitor their implementation. Effective implementation of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements is a prerequisite for any further assessment by 
the EU of the country’s prospects of accession.84 
 
 
5.3. FINAL REMARKS 
 
 
This chapter presented the different policies used by the EU as a third party in 
Croatia’s and FYROM’s post-conflict environments in order to prevent the re-emergence 
of the conflicts. Some of these policies were directly designed to address the root causes 
of the conflicts. Some other, though, were not designed for that or only for that purpose. 
For the CR field, however, if a policy, instrument, etc. affects and changes the conflict, or 
the post-conflict in our case, environment or the conflicting parties it is regarded as a 
third part intervention. Consequently, in this chapter every EU policy or instrument 
which affected the overall post-conflict environment and/or the conflicting parties is 
examined. 
 
At that point it should be indicated the difficulty to gather all necessary 
information related to EU’s intervention in the post-conflict environment of Croatia and 
FYROM. The most difficult part was to find information about NGOs’ projects funded 
by the EU. As mentioned before, due to the lack of an official source of information, I 
had to depend on my own research, meaning that I had to contact myself NGOs in both 
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countries and ask information about their EU funded projects. The second problem came 
from the fact that I could not go to the field, so I had to depend on communication via e-
mail or telephone. In most of the cases my requests were not answered so, even though I 
have no clue about the number and the nature of EU funded NGO projects in both 
countries, it is very likely that important information are missing from this research.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
ANALYSES 
 
 
 
The previous chapter presented the various EU’s actions of intervention, in the 
post-conflict Croatia and FYROM. At that point it is necessary to evaluate these actions, 
according to Beriker’s framework, adopted in this thesis, thus to identify them with the 
framework’s categories. At the end two tables will summarize the findings, in order to 
have a clear picture of how many instruments the EU used in each case, what are the 
similarities and which are the differences between them. At the end the second research 
question will be answered; what type of intervention did the EU has in the post-conflict 
Croatia and FYROM.  
 
 
6.1. CROATIA 
 
 
1) European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 
 
This humanitarian intervention aims at helping the people affected by the war, Croats 
and Serbs, and mainly the return of refugees, by providing assistance in kind (food, 
hygiene supplies, winter clothing, etc). It is a peace building activity, of the B2 
instruments of the framework, thus a structural intervention, “designed to change the 
incentive of the disputing parties with the expectation that they would lead the parties to 
  96 
change their conflict behavior” (Beriker, 2007:25). Besides, humanitarian aid is a tool 
broadly used by the EU worldwide, especially after a crisis case.  
 
2) 1996-200 ASSISTANCE 
 
Assistance for independent media, de-mining, and democratization is part of a peace 
building process which aims to eliminate the structural causes of a conflict through 
democratic processes. Therefore, this activity is part of the B2 instruments of the 
framework.   
 
 
3) SANCTIONS 
 
The two sanctions mentioned aimed to hold senior individuals responsible for the 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. Negative incentives, such as sanctions, are designed to change the 
parties’ behavior and the course of the conflict. It is, therefore, a B4 action.  
 
 
 
4) EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 
PROGRAMME  
 
Due to the lack of information about the programme is not possible to evaluate it. 
Assistance to NGO projects for the development of democracy and civil society can take 
various forms; without knowing the exact type of this assistance we cannot know if it is a 
transformative or a structural intervention. 
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5) EUPOP 
 
The EU reconstruction program for return, which helps municipalities to rebuild 
houses, schools, and health centers and strengthen local enterprises, is another example of 
structural intervention. More concretely, it is an infrastructure building program, part of 
the peacebuilding mechanism, B2, of the framework, which aims to address the structural 
causes of the conflict, with the overall goal that this will lead to the change of parties’ 
behavior.  
 
 
6) ASSISTANCE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED 
PERSONS,1999  
 
Money given for rehabilitation of houses and similar infrastructures is an 
infrastructure building activity, thus a B2 action. The action aims to change the 
environment of the conflict, with the expectation that this will help the parties change 
their behavior.  
 
 
7) ASSISTANCE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED 
PERSONS,2000  
 
Exactly the same case as number 7 case, but different year. A B2 action.  
 
 
8) STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 
 
This is another organization created by the EU in order to strengthen the efforts of the 
countries of South East Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights 
and economic prosperity, in return for the EU’s conditionality. The stability pact is a 
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peacebuilding activity, B2 category, designed to eliminate the structural causes of the 
conflict though democratic processes.   
 
 
 
 
 
9) EU EXPERTS HELP CROATIA 
 
The EU experts helped Croatia to launch in the best way the economic and political 
reforms, necessary for Croatia’s prospect of integration into the EU. It is an institution 
building activity which helps the parties to build and develop democratic institutions in 
order to eliminate the structural causes of the conflict. Therefore, it is another B2 action.   
 
 
10) SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN RETURN AREAS THROUGH CIVIL 
SOCIETY PROJECT  
 
Another institution and infrastructure building activity, therefore a B2 type of 
intervention, which aims to eliminate the structural causes of the conflict through 
democratic processes, in order to change the parties’ behavior.  
 
 
11) NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL 
MINORITIES 
 
Constitution change is a peacebuilding effort, thus a B2 action, designed to eliminate 
the structural causes of a conflict, though democratic processes, with a long-term aim to 
change the parties’ behavior.  
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12) ADOPTION OF REGIONAL APPROACH, 1997 
 
The regional approach, by which Croatia has to fulfill certain conditions, in order to 
come closer to the EU entry, is a special EU policy towards possible future candidate 
countries. For the CR field it is a type of positive incentive, thus a B1 type of 
intervention, through which the party is getting rewarded, financially and politically, by a 
third party, in order to change its conflict behavior.  
 
 
13) STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS 
 
As mentioned above the SAP is an EU tool for preparing the country to enter the EU 
in the future. It was not designed by the EU to settle or prevent any conflict directly. 
Nevertheless, SAP is a major intervention in the post-conflict environment of the country, 
which changed the post-conflict environment of the parties, leading them to change their 
conflict behavior. It is, consequently, a structural intervention, with the overall form of 
the positive incentive (B1 category); Croatia’s future in the EU depends on its ability to 
fulfill its responsibilities given in the SAP.   
 
Despite its positive incentive nature, special attention should be paid to the CARDS 
Programme of the SAP. Through CARDS the EU offers humanitarian assistance; 
supports the development of government institutions and legislation; establishes 
democracy and the rule of law; promotes reconciliation and facilitates the return of 
refugees; supports social development and structural reforms; and promotes regional 
cooperation in the area of the Western Balkans aiming to help the country meet the 
European standards and eventually integrate into the EU. Thus, the various CARDS 
policies fall into the peacebuilding/peacekeeping category. For instance, housing 
reconstruction, de-mining, support to the civil society, constitution changes, institution 
building, are just some areas financed by the CARDS, which eliminate the structural 
causes of the conflict, changing parties’ behavior, even though the program was not 
designed for that purpose.  
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 The Regional Approach and the SAP are part of the EU conditionality policy 
towards the Western Balkans. Anastasakis & Bechev argue that EU conditionality is “a 
multi-dimensional instrument geared towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform” 
(2003: 8) and the most powerful EU instrument for dealing with those countries and 
preparing national authorities for integration. SAP is especially the longest-term 
commitment to the countries.  
 
6.2. THE FORMER YUGOLSAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
 
1) EU MILITARY OPERATION CONCORDIA 
 
A military operation which aims to build a stable environment and implement a peace 
agreement is a tool of peacekeeping intervention, thus a B2 type of action.  
 
2) EU POLICE MISSION PROXIMA 
 
The EU’s police mission in FYROM was designed to implement the Ohrid 
Agreement and to assist the country’s police to move closer to the EU standards. 
Therefore, it meets the criteria of the B2 category of intervention.  
 
 
3) EU POLICE ADVISORY TEAM 
 
EU’s police advisory team continued PROXIMA’s work for the reformation of 
FYROM’s police, according to the European standards. Thus, it is an EU institution 
building intervention; B2 category.  
 
4) RAPID REACTION MECHANISM 
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All rapid reaction mechanism’s activities, described in the previous chapter, are part 
of an institution and infrastructure building process, which aims to eliminate the 
structural causes of the conflict through democratic processes. Thus, it is part of the B2 
category.  
 
 
 
5) SANCTIONS 
 
Sanctions and restricted measures, as mentioned again, are tools of structural 
intervention, which aims firstly, to change the conflicting environment and secondly, to 
change the parties’ behavior. Consequently it meets the description of the B4 category.  
 
 
6) SUPPORT TO RECONCILIATION 
 
The appointment of a high-level policy advisor to the Deputy Minister for the 
implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, and more concrete for those parts of the 
agreement related to the equitable representation of minorities, is an attempt to change 
the structure of the disputing parties, with the aim that this would lead to the change of 
their behavior. Consequently, it is a B2 type of intervention.   
 
 
7) PROMOTION OF TOLERANCE IN SCHOOLS THROUGH EXTRA-
CURRICULA ACTIVITIES 
 
This EU funded project brought together school students from different ethnic-
backgrounds, under the supervision of their teachers. It is a conflict resolution training 
activity (A3), through which the students-participants learned how to deal with their 
differences in a more effective way. Conflict resolution training is part of the 
transformative intervention.  
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8) TRAINING OF CIVIL SERVANTS 
 
The training of civil servants is another example of institution building (B2), which 
aims to build a civil service representing the ethnic diversity of the country, in order to 
eliminate the structural causes of the conflict and change parties’ conflict behavior.    
  
9) INTER-ETNHIC RECONCILIATION PROJECTS 
 
Due to the lack of information about the concrete nature of these projects it is not 
possible to evaluate them.  
 
 
10) CHILDREN’S PUPPET THEATER 
 
The EU funded project offered conflict resolution training (A3) to children with the 
aim of preparing them to be more effective in dealing with their differences. It is another 
example of third party transformative intervention.   
 
 
11) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
This EU funded project, which aimed to support the development of the civil society, 
is a type of structural intervention. More concrete, it is an institution building project (B2) 
which aims to eliminate the structural causes of the conflict through democratic 
processes.  
 
 
12) STABILITY PACT 
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This is another organization created by the EU in order to strengthen the efforts of the 
countries of South East Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights 
and economic prosperity, in return for the EU’s conditionality. The stability pact is a 
peace building activity, therefore a B2 type of structural intervention, designed to 
eliminate the structural causes of the conflict though democratic processes.   
 
 
 
13) ECHO 
 
14.1. ECHO humanitarian assistance to people affected by the crisis is an example of 
structural intervention. It is an infrastructure and capacity building activity (B2) designed 
to eliminate the structural causes of the conflict with an expectation that the parties will 
change their conflict behavior.  
 
14.2. The second type of ECHO’s contribution, however, is a transformative 
intervention, and more concretely an A4 type. Community services and psycho-social 
activities designed to assist conflict-affected women and children are part of a post-
conflict reconstruction activity, through which the third party supports social 
rehabilitation efforts.  
 
 
14) IMPROVEMENT OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS 
 
In this interactive conflict resolution project, funded by the EU, people from both 
parties formed small problem-solving working groups in order to solve their differences 
in informal settings. Consequently, it is an A2 type of intervention.  
 
 
15) HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION 
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This assistance was given for the reconstruction of war affected areas and more 
concrete for infrastructure building. It is another B2 type of intervention, which aims to 
eliminate the structural causes of the conflict, with the aim to change parties’ behavior.   
 
 
16) AMNESTY LAW 
 
Law changes are part of a peace building process, B2, designed to help the parties 
build and develop democratic institutions in order to eliminate the structural causes of the 
conflict.  
 
 
17) ADOPTION OF REGIONAL APPROACH 
 
The regional approach, by which FYROM has to fulfill certain conditions, in order to 
come closer to the EU entry, is a special EU policy towards possible future candidate 
countries. For the CR field it is a type of positive incentive, thus a B1 type of 
intervention, through which the party is getting rewarded, financially and politically, by a 
third party, in order to change its conflict behavior.  
 
 
 
18) SAP 
As mentioned again, the SAP is an EU accession tool, treated in this thesis as a 
positive incentive (B1) instrument for conflict prevention. Special attention should 
again be drawn to the CARDS part of the process, which works as a 
peacebuilding/peacekeeping tool.  
 
 
 
6.3. CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS 
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From the above analysis it is clear that the vast majority of the EU conflict 
resolution instruments fall into the structural intervention, and more concrete into the 
peacebuilding/peacekeeping, category. The tables summarize in detail the findings. The 
letters used to describe each instrument are in respect to Beriker’s framework, presented 
in the 18th page of the thesis.  
 
 
 
 
Country EU’s conflict resolution intervention 
A)Transformative 
Intervention B) Structural Intervention 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 1 10 0 1 0 0 
TOTAL 0 12 
Table 5: EU’s conflict resolution actions in post-conflict Croatia. 
 
 
 
Country EU’s conflict resolution intervention 
A)Transformative 
Intervention B) Structural Intervention 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
FYROM 0 1 2 1 1 11 0 1 0 0 
TOTAL 4 13 
Table 6: EU’s conflict resolution actions in the FYROM. 
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 Six EU instruments are common in both cases: ECHO, sanctions, Stability Pact, 
law changes, Regional Approach and SAP. The biggest difference is the absence of any 
military or police missions in Croatia, even under the peacekeeping category, and the 
absence of any transformative intervention. The rest of the mechanisms are very much 
similar to each other, mainly under the peacebuilding/peacekeeping category.   
 
More concretely, EU used in both countries a variety of 
peacebuilding/peacekeeping mechanisms, such as humanitarian aid, reconstruction help, 
assistance for the return of refugees, and institution building. Furthermore, in both cases 
EU used a positive incentive and a sanction tool, whereas it did not use neither any 
bilateral cooperative programs, nor power mediation, nor military intervention. Similarly, 
it did not engage in facilitative mediation. Finally, the research shows that interactive 
conflict resolution, conflict resolution training and post-conflict reconstruction were only 
used in FYROM, but not in Croatia. A more detailed discussion about the EU’s 
intervention mechanisms will follow in the next and final chapter.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Cases comparison 
 
The research reveals some commonalities and some important differences, with 
regard to the EU’s conflict resolution intervention in the post-conflict Croatia and the 
FYROM. Firstly, most of the instruments available to the EU were used in both cases. 
Secondly, the majority of those instruments are under the peacebuilding/peacekeeping 
category. Thirdly, in both cases one positive and one negative incentive were used, while 
there is lack of any facilitative mediation, bilateral cooperative programs, power 
mediation and military intervention.  
 
The biggest difference is the absence of any military/police mission, as well as the 
lack of any transformative mechanism in Croatia. Furthermore, it worth mentioning the 
fact that even though the FYROM’s post conflict period is half than Croatia’s, the EU 
used more conflict resolution mechanisms. In order to explain these differences it is 
necessary to refer to the overall structure and characteristics of the two cases, as 
explained at the end of the historical chapter.  
 
A quite obvious explanation from those differences comes from the developments 
within the EU with regard to its conflict resolution capabilities. From the beginning of 
’90s the EU has been driving to define its role in the international arena. However, the 
EU’s ambition for being a global actor of high standing and major influence became 
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more articulated towards the end of 1990s. With the adoption of new policies and the 
creation of new institutions related to conflict resolution, crisis management and 
peacebuilding, the EU developed further its intervention capabilities for conflict 
resolution. An example of these developments is the creation of the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism and its use in FYROM’s crisis. This development towards the end of the ’90s 
is reflected in this study, which shows that EU’s intervention in Croatia and FYROM has 
mainly been the last seven to ten years. 
 
Throughout the same period that the EU was undertaking a more active role in 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding, Croatia had already made enough progress in 
regards to its post-conflict situation and it did not need some of the new established EU’s 
tools of conflict prevention, such as military missions, monitoring missions, etc. At that 
point it is necessary to refer to the limitations of my research. The tools of transformative 
intervention used by the EU come mainly through NGOs’ projects, funded by the EU. In 
order to find such information I had to contact various NGOs working on the two 
countries. In the case of the FYROM my research was more fruitful, while in Croatia’s 
case I faced more problems.  
 
While the connection between the EU’s conflict resolution capabilities, 
strengthened after 2000s, and the number of instruments used in both cases is quite clear, 
the effect that other differences between the two cases might had on the EU’s 
intervention is not so straight forward. It requires further inquiry in order to make any 
connection between the overall characteristics of the two conflicts and the conflict 
resolution mechanisms used by the EU.       
 
 
Theoretical implications 
 
As seen from the previous analysis, the EU’s intervention in the post-conflict 
Croatia and FYROM is mainly a structural intervention, which aims to change the 
structure of the conflict with the expectation that this will make the parties change their 
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behavior, while measures related to the relations of the parties are not used 
systematically. This conclusion reassures the assumptions of the few studies in the CR 
literature which have also addressed the EU’s involvement as a third party in conflicting 
situations. Furthermore, the research reveals the EU commitment on institution-building 
and democratization, as methods of conflict resolution, as the literature also points out.  
 
The framework adopted in this thesis is Beriker’s framework of third party roles, 
as presented in detail in the second chapter of this thesis. The reason I chose to adopt this 
framework is because it comes from the limited conflict resolution literature on 
international actors, such as the EU, which intervene as third parties in conflicting 
situations.  
 
This research shows the variety of instruments used by a third party, the EU, in 
the post-conflict environment of Croatia and FYROM. On the one hand, it was possible 
to identify all EU tools in the framework’s categories. There was no EU instrument that 
could not be identified with one of the framework’s category. Thus, the strength of the 
framework is that it is very comprehensive and it includes a big variety of third-party 
instruments of intervention.  
 
Even though all EU intervention instruments which came out of this research 
could be found in the framework, some times the examples given in some categories did 
not explicitly name some instruments. In that case the agreement of the EU instrument 
with the specific category was implied by the definition. It would be, therefore, useful to 
add those instruments, which came from the research, to the framework in order to make 
it even clearer.  
 
In the case of the peacebuilding/peacekeeping category the actions suggested by 
the framework are: institution building, electoral systems, financial reforms, and 
constitutional changes. The actions the framework provides an be further expanded to the 
categories of: infrastructure building (i.e. building the destroyed or damaged houses of 
the war affected people); strengthening of civil society; the humanitarian assistance (i.e. 
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providing the victims with food, shelter, clothes, etc); as well as capacity building (i.e. 
support municipalities’ and local communities’ abilities to support the return and the 
rehabilitation of refugees) as it was outlined in this research.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that all instruments found under the 
peacebuilding/peacekeeping category are actually peacebuilding instruments, it is very 
likely that it would be better to separate this category into two different categories: 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping. However, in order for that to happen more research is 
needed that will test the framework. 
 
A last point regarding the framework is about the “post-conflict reconstruction” 
instrument of the transformative intervention. It is easy for the reader to confuse this 
category with the reconstruction activities of the peacebuilding category, which is a 
structural intervention. It needs full attention and carefully reading of the explanation 
given by the author, in order to realize that the “post-conflict reconstruction” instrument 
actually refers to social rehabilitation activities. If the name of the instrument was clearer 
regarding its context I believe it would not leave any space for misunderstandings.  
 
    
Policy implications 
 
 
 As mentioned before, the research shows that the EU’s intervention is almost 
exclusively a structural intervention, while the literature highlights the importance of 
addressing post-conflict issues both via transformative and structural intervention. 
Structural intervention can tackle issues, such as infrastructure building, constitution 
amendments, economic and political reforms, etc. Transformative intervention on the 
other hand, addresses issues related to the parties’ perceptions and relationships and aims 
to reconciliation and social rehabilitation. It is, therefore, necessary for the EU to realize 
the importance of using simultaneously both types of intervention.  
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It is not enough for the EU to realize the importance of the transformative 
intervention. In order to be able to transform this into action it should strengthen its 
cooperation with the civil society and the NGOs. From this research comes out that all 
instruments of transformative intervention used by the EU are actually NGOs projects 
funded by the EU. The EU should not just wait for the NGOs to develop conflict 
resolution programs and ask for funding. It should require this type of projects and 
establish offices and institutions which, in cooperation with the other conflict resolution 
institutions, will coordinate and design activities of transformative intervention.  
  
According to the literature, given in a previous chapter, the EU uses mainly 
civilian and not hard power. This research reassures this point, since almost all 
instruments used by the EU are under the “soft power” or civilian category, such as 
promotion of human rights, reconstruction programs, economic and political reforms, 
democratization, etc. The questions, however, which arises at that point is how effective 
can this type of intervention by itself be, and specifically in other areas of the world, 
where the prospect of membership does not exist. 
 
The main instrument used by the EU is that of attraction: the prospect of 
integration into the EU is being used as an incentive for making the conflicting parties of 
both countries deal with their conflicts in a more constructive way. There is no doubt that 
membership and privileged neighborhood relations are among the EU’s most powerful 
tools, which can be used in order to bring stability in its periphery. Past enlargements 
have proven that countries are willing to do a lot in order to join the EU and benefit from 
the political and economic effects of this relationship. The potential future candidate 
members are countries from EU’s neighborhood and for that I say that this tool is useful 
only in its periphery. The carrot of membership is used in order to make Croatia and 
FYROM become effective democratic states, deal with unemployment and poverty, fight 
corruption and organize crime, deal effectively with the problems which led to wars in 
the past and build closer relations with their neighbors. The question that rises at that 
point about EU’s conflict resolution capacity in its periphery is if the offer of membership 
is enough by itself to ameliorate conflicting situations and bring peace and stability.   
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Particularly for other parts of the EU’s periphery, which have gone through long, 
violent conflicts and had a deep impact on the conflicting parties’ perceptions, such as the 
rest of the Western Balkans or the south Caucasus countries, an EU intervention should 
offer more than just support for institution building. With regard to other parts of the 
world where the EU would like to intervene, other instruments have to be used. The EU 
should advance its military capabilities, since the offer of economic or political 
inducement cannot be used for countries which have small or no interaction with the EU.  
Furthermore, providing humanitarian aid during crises or after the end of an armed 
conflict cannot continue to be the main instrument of intervention, if the EU wants to 
become a global actor. For instance, humanitarian aid should be directly connected to 
development programs. As a general conclusion, I would suggest the EU to become more 
familiar with the CR literature in order to become more effective on its conflict resolution 
missions.   
 
 
 
Future research 
   
The current thesis is a research on the EU conflict resolution mechanisms used in 
the post-conflict environment of Croatia and FYROM. The assumptions reached and 
discussed throughout the thesis, however, cannot be generalized so as to cover EU’s 
conflict resolution policy worldwide, not even in its periphery. Nevertheless the research 
gives some stimulus for further research.   
 
It would be appealing, to compare the findings of this thesis with future research 
on EU conflict resolution mechanisms during the conflict period in Croatia and FYROM. 
Such a comparison would be very interesting, because it would give a more complete 
picture of the EU intervention in those two cases from the beginning of the conflicts till 
now.  
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Another possible future use of this thesis is to compare it with research about EU 
interventions in other cases, as to see if EU has a concrete conflict resolution or a more 
flexible strategy worldwide. The cases could be from its periphery in order to reveal if 
EU’s policy towards neighboring countries is mainly the same. If a comparison is made 
with cases come from other parts of the world it would show the possible differences and 
similarities of EU’s tools of intervention, depending on the geography. Such comparisons 
would complete our knowledge about EU’s conflict resolution policies.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1991-2000 EC assistance to Croatia 
Allocations in millions of €85 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL 
 
CROATIA 
 
           
Obnova 
(reconstruction 
and technical 
assistance)      7.02 8.59 15.00 15.00 16.84 62.45 
 
ECHO 
humanitarian 
aid 
  204.77 38.43 21.15 14.5 6.95 6.50 n.a. 292.3 
Media    0.09 0.31 0.72 1.67 0.59  0.20 3.58 
Democracy 
and Human 
Rights      0.72 2.2 0.6 n.a. 0.90 4.42 
Demining        1.00 0.50 0.308 1.808 
Customs         1.0  1.0 
Tempus          1.50 1.50 
            
TOTAL  204.77 0.09 38.74 29.61 26.96 24.14 23.00 19.748 367.058 
 
 
CARDS 2002 CROATIA86 
 Priority Areas M€ 
1 DEMOCRATIC STABILIZATION 16.0 
1.1 Return of refugees and internal displaced people 14.0 
1.2 Civil society 2.0 
2 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 18.0 
2.1 Trade 3.0 
2.2 Investment climate 9.0 
2.3 Social cohesion  6.0 
3 JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 10.0 
3.1 Modernisation of justice 4.0 
3.2 Policing and organized crime 2.0 
3.3 Integrated border management 4.0 
4 ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY BUILDING 12.0 
                                                 
85
 http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents/assist_croatia.pdf 
 
86
 http://www.delhrv.ec.europa.eu/images/article/File/croatia_programme_2002_en.pdf  
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4.1 Public Administration Reform 6.0 
4.2 National, regional and local development 2.0 
4.3 Public finance 4.0 
5 ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES 3.0 
5.1 Strategy for environmental law 1.2 
5.2 Pilot waste management strategy for four Dalmatian countries 0.8 
5.3 Water information system – standardization and monitoring 0.8 
5.4 Support to environmental NGOs 0.2 
 
TOTAL 59.0 
 
 
 
CARDS 2003 Croatia87 
 Priority Areas M€ 
1 DEMOCRATIC STABILIZATION 17.0 
1.1 Return of refugees and internal displaced people 15.0 
1.2 Civil society 2.0 
2 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 17.5 
2.1 Trade 2.5 
2.2 Investment climate 6.15 
2.3 Social cohesion (including TEMPUS 3 million) 8.85 
3 JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 12.0 
3.1 Modernisation of justice 4.0 
3.2 Policing and organized crime 3.0 
3.3 Integrated border management 5.0 
4 ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY BUILDING 11.8 
4.1 Public Administration Reform 6.0 
4.2 National, regional and local development 3.0 
4.3 Public finance 2.8 
5 ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES 3.7 
 
TOTAL 62.0 
 
 
 
 
CARDS 2004 CROATIA88 
 Priority Areas M€ 
1 DEMOCRATIC STABILIZATION 17.0 
1.1 Sustainable Development in Areas of Special State Concern 14.0 
1.2 Civil society development 3.5 
2 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 17.75 
3 JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 26.85 
4 ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY BUILDING 15.1 
5 ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES 3.8 
 
TOTAL 81.0 
 
                                                 
87
 http://www.delhrv.ec.europa.eu/images/article/File/ap_croatia_2003_en.pdf 
88
 http://www.delhrv.ec.europa.eu/images/article/File/ap_2004_hr_ammend_en.pdf 
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CARDS 2003 FYROM89 
1 Democracy & the rule of law   
1.1 Inter-ethnic relations & civil society €3 million 
2 Economic & social development   
2.1 Private & financial sector development €3 million 
2.2 Trade €4 million 
2.3 Local infrastructure development €9 million 
2.4 Social cohesion €1 million 
2.5  Tempus (Commission managed) €3 million 
3 Justice & home affairs   
3.1  Reform of the judiciary €2.5 million 
3.2 Integrated border management €6 million 
3.3  Immigration & asylum €1 million 
3.4 Fight against crime €3 million 
4 Environment & natural resources   
4.1 Environment / Cross-border cooperation €1 million 
5 Other   
5.1 General technical assistance facility & programme reserve €2 million 
 TOTAL  
 
 
 
CARDS 2004 FYROM90 
1 Democracy & the rule of law   
1.1 Inter-ethnic relations & civil society €3.0 million 
2 Economic & social development   
2.1 Private & financial sector development €4.5 million 
2.2 Trade €4.0 million 
2.3 Local infrastructure development €8.5 million 
                                                 
89
 http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/macedonia.htm 
90
 http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/macedonia.htm 
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2.4 Social cohesion €2.5 million 
2.5  Tempus (Commission managed) €3.0 million 
3 Justice & home affairs   
3.1  Reform of the judiciary €1.5 million 
3.2 Integrated border management 
€10.0 
million 
3.4 Fight against crime €4.0 million 
4 Environment & natural resources   
4.1 Environment €2.0 million 
5 Other   
5.1 General technical assistance facility & programme reserve €3.0 million 
 TOTAL  
 
 
 
CARDS 2005 FYROM91 
 Democratic stabilisation    
1.1. Minority rights    
1.1.1. Implementation of the Framework Agreement  €2.0 million 
2 Good governance & institutional building    
2.1. Justice & home affairs   
2.1.1. Support to the Public Prosecutor's Office  €1.5 million 
2.1.2. Combating money laundering (phase II)  €1.5 million 
2.1.3. Strengthening capacity to combat organised crime & terrorism  €0.5 million 
2.2. Public administration reform    
2.2.1 Support to the State Statistical Office  €1.0 million 
2.2.2. Technical assistance to the telecommunications sector  €1.0 million 
2.2.3. Capacity building in support to the decentralisation of management 
of assistance  
€1.3 million 
2.2.4. Support of decentralisation process €2.0 million 
                                                 
91
 http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/macedonia.htm 
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2.2.5. Development of local infrastructure  €6.7 million 
2.2.6. Customs & Taxation  €3.0 million 
3 Economic & social development    
3.1. Investment climate    
3.1.1. Improvement of the investment climate in FYR Macedonia  €1.2 million 
3.1.2. Small & medium-size enterprise development  €2.4 million 
3.2. Infrastructure   
3.2.1. Co-operation with IFIs – Transport networks management €1.0 million 
3.2.2. Co-operation with IFIs – Environmental management  €1.0 million 
3.3. Environment   
3.3.1. Environmental management strengthening (phase III)  €2.0 million 
3.4. Education & employment    
3.4.1. TEMPUS: Multilateral co-operation for the development and 
restructuring of higher education  
€3.0 million 
4 Other   
4.1. General technical assistance facility & programme reserve €1.4 million 
5 Community Programmes    
5.1. Opening of Community Programmes  €2.0 million 
 TOTAL  
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